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NIXON V. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC:
FURTHER DISSENSION OVER THE FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
Gail Kiak Martens'
"Thereare two things that are important in politics. The first is
money and I can't remember what the second one is."
-U.S. Senator Mark Hanna (OH), 1895.1
"If you think this Congress, or any other, is going to set up a
system where someone can run againstthem on equal terms at
government expense, you're smoking something that you can't
buy at the comer drugstore."
-U.S. Representative Richard Cheney (WY), 1983.2
Political campaigns and money have been intimately
connected virtually since the creation of the American system of
government.3 The financial needs of politicians were originally
As the nation grew in population and commercial
modest.
+ J.D.

Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.

1. Thomas A. Mann, The U.S. Campaign Finance System Under Strain, in
(Henry J.
Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999). Mark Hanna, an Ohio political boss
and campaign fundraiser for William McKinley in the late 1890s, solicited funds
from corporations and banks and financed extensive political advertisements.
See also Charles C. Euchner & John Anthony Maltese, The Electoral Process, in
SELECTING THE PRESIDENT: FROM 1789 TO 1996 at 38 (1997) (describing how
Hanna used money to "influence possible delegates, and to pay for the kind of
mass propaganda campaign that would change the face of national politics
forever").
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION AND BEYOND 450

2. DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE 213 (1992) (agreeing with Representative Cheney that it is unrealistic
to think Congress will pass reform legislation that will make fundraising more
difficult).
3.

See GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN

FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 25 (1973) (describing efforts by
George Washington to secure votes through the distribution of rum, wine, beer,
and hard cider); Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 37 (noting the creation
and financing of a newspaper by Thomas Jefferson to oppose the policies of
President Adams).
4. See THAYER, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that in 1789, the year George
Washington became the first president of the United States, campaign financing
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strength, however, the politicians' need for money also
increased. 5 Wealthy citizens usually supplied this money6 with
an expectation of more from their elected officials than merely
representation within the government.7 As the trend towards
greater involvement by wealthy contributors developed, the
political landscape of America began to be molded less by the
statesman and more by the businessman.8 Calls for reform soon
followed.9
Congress responded by enacting various laws designed to curb
the influence of generous donors over the politicians they helped
elect.' ° Most of these laws were ineffectual," yet the legislature
routinely enact statutes' 2 in a ceaseless effort to limit the
played no part in the election). In addition, most government positions in the
newly formed nation were filled by appointment or through an open ballot at a
town meeting directed and dominated by the local aristocracy. Id. at 25.
5. See id. at 27-29 (attributing the changes in election financing to the
upsurge of the popular vote in elections).
Campaign costs increased
significantly during the presidency of Andrew Jackson due, in part, to the
increase in eligible voters caused by the easing of voter qualifications. See id. at
28.
6. See id. at 30-31 (noting that wealthy businessmen recognized the
growing need to influence government policies that affected their interests).
During the mid-1800s, rising industrialists such as the DuPonts of Delaware
contributed large amounts of money to political candidates to influence
government policies. Id. at 31.
7. Id. at 30-31 (noting that "[wealthy industrialists] realized it was in their
own interests to exert whatever influence they could over the legislative and
bureaucratic processes of government. The easiest way to exert influence was
with cash at campaign time.").
8. See id. at 38-43. The late 1800s was a period when large businesses
with interests in oil, railroads, and banks financed the majority of political
campaigns. See id. at 38. A business would finance a particular candidate in
an effort to block a specific area of legislation detrimental to their interests. See
id. at 39. The extent of this influence was extensive. See id. at 38-43.
9. Id. at 52 (describing demands by Progressive Reformers to decrease the
influence of big business in the political process).
10. Id. at 54. Among early legislative efforts passed to counter influential
campaign contributions was the Publicity Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 822, which
required detailed accountings of all campaign receipts and expenditures to be
filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Id.
11. See Anthony Corrado, Introduction to a Hi. tory of Federal Campaign
Finance Law, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 29 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,

1997) (explaining that most campaign finance legislation proved ineffective due
to poor enforcement and loopholes in the laws that allowed contributors to
counter individual limitations by funneling donations through multiple
candidate committees).
12. See, e.g., Hatch Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 3333, 7311, 7324, 7325
(1994); Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18 U.S.C. § 602 (1994); Taft-
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3
corrupting influence of money in elections.'
In 1971, Congress enacted an extensive and important
campaign finance reform, 14 entitled the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA)."5 Central among the various regulations
instituted by FECA were those implementing strict limitations on
campaign contributions 6 and restricting expenditures by
candidates.' 7 The Supreme Court, in the 1976 case of Buckley v.
Valeo,'8 considered the constitutionality of these newly created
caps on expenditures and contributions.' 9 Opponents of FECA
argued that the statutorily imposed limitations suppressed
speech in direct violation of the First Amendment. 20 Although
the Court agreed that both contributions and expenditures
could be characterized as "speech," it distinguished between the

two 2 ' and provided greater protection to expenditures. 22

The

Hartley Act of 1947, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1994).
13. See Corrado, supra note 11, at 27-34 (reviewing those laws enacted by
Congress in the past century to reform campaign finance practices).
14. See Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 39 (describing the Federal
Election Campaign Act as "the most important piece of campaign finance
legislation since the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act").
15. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1), (3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975) (limiting individual
contributions to a single candidate for federal office to $1000 per year and
restricting overall political contributions by an individual to $25,000 per year).
FECA also made illegal all contributions to a political candidate from national
banks, corporations, and labor organizations. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1994).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (imposing limitations on
expenditures by a candidate of his own personal funds or those of his
immediate family for a federal election campaign); 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (limiting
overall expenditures by a candidate in a federal election campaign); 18 U.S.C. §
608(e) (restricting expenditures by individuals for a clearly defined candidate to
$1000 per year).
Expenditures by national banks, corporations, and labor
organizations to support candidates for federal office were also prohibited. See
18 U.S.C. § 610.
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 7 (reviewing the constitutionality of the statutory limitations
enacted by the Federal Election Campaign Act and its 1974 amendments).
20. Id. at 11 ("In appellants' view, limiting the use of money for political
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First
Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political communications in the
modem setting involve the expenditure of money.").
21. Id. at 44 (clarifying that expenditure limitations impose much greater
restraints on speech than do contribution limits; the "Act's expenditure
limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and
association than do its contribution limitations.").
22. Id. at 44-45 (concluding that expenditure limitations impose greater
restrictions on free speech than do contribution limitations and must, therefore,
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Court reasoned that although both limitations restrained
speech, those on contributions were "marginally restrictive, ,,23
24
while those on expenditures were "substantially restrictive."
The Court invalidated the expenditure limitations as an
unconstitutional restraint on free speech.25 The Court, however,
upheld the limitations on contributions2 6 because such
restraints were less intrusive than those on expenditures and
supported Congress's compelling interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corrupt practices.
In Buckley, the Court largely re-wrote critical sections of
FECA' 28 dramatically altering the regulatory structure intended
and created by Congress.
In the twenty-five years after
meet the "exacting scrutiny" afforded First Amendment matters to be found
constitutional).
23. Id. at 20 ("[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group
may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal
restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication.").
See infra note 99 (describing alternative modes of political expression available
to contributors).
24. Id. at 19 (concluding that limitations on expenditures are substantially
restrictive because they directly restrict the quantity of a candidate's
communication). See infra note 106 (noting the direct correlation between a
candidate's expenditures and the quantity of speech available to him).
25. Id. at 39 (contending that although the expenditure limitations were
content-neutral, they were unconstitutional because their effects directly
reduced the amount of speech that could be communicated by both candidates
and political parties).
26. See id. at 20-21 (explaining that the quantity of expression did not
increase proportionately with higher levels of campaign contributions). The
Court reasoned that the expression involved was the actual act of giving money
to a candidate and as long as that act was not prohibited, limitations relating to
amounts were not significantly restraining expression. Id.
27. See id. at 29 (finding that the "weighty interests served by restricting the
size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the
limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms").
28. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(e), with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51 (comparing
FECA's $1000 limitation on individual expenditures for a candidate in a federal
campaign to the Court's judgment that such a limitation is unconstitutional
because it "fails to serve any substantial governmental interest... [and] heavily
burdens core First Amendment Expression"). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(c), with
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55 (comparing FECA's overall limitation on expenditures
by candidates to the Court's finding that "no governmental interest [I has been
suggested [that] is sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political
expression imposed by § 608(c)'s campaign expenditure limitations") Compare
18 U.S.C. § 608(a), with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52 (comparing statutory
limitations on expenditures by candidates from personal or family resources to
the Court's holding that such limits "clearly and directly interfere[] with
constitutionally protected freedoms" and are thus unconstitutional).
29. See 120 Cong. Rec. 9980-81 (1974) (statement of Sen. Clark) (clarifying

20011

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

823

Buckley, the Court continued to reformulate campaign finance
regulations through its various decisions. 30 During this time
members of the Court often questioned the appropriateness
of
31
laws.
finance
campaign
of
revision
substantial
Court's
the
Despite legislative and judicial efforts to guard against
corruption, or the appearance of corruption, discontent with the
current structure of campaign finance is vigorous and
practically universal.3 2 Although FECA is still the primary
regulatory scheme governing federal election campaigns, 33 its
Congress's belief that limitations on both contributions and expenditures were
necessary to establish an effective campaign finance regulatory scheme).
30. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604, 608 (1996) (prohibiting application of a FECA provision disallowing
independent expenditures by political parties); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986) (finding unconstitutional a FECA
provision prohibiting direct expenditures of corporate funds for campaign
purposes); FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)
(overturning a provision limiting independent expenditures by political parties
for a candidate receiving public campaign funds).
31. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (advising that the Court should defer to the judgments of Congress
and state legislatures). According to then Justice Rehnquist, "[tihe judgment of
such a broad consensus of governmental bodies expressed over a period of
many decades is entitled to considerable deference from this Court." Id.; see
also FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (accepting
Congress's judgment that FECA provisions prohibiting funds from corporations
or labor unions to be used in federal elections). The Court explained that the
provision reflected the legislature's judgment on the issue and it would not
"second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic
measures where corruption is the evil feared." National Right to Work Comr.,
459 U.S. at 210; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the Court's deference to legislative
action when a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise ...the
Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments").
32. See Thomas P. Wyman, Campaign Finance Issues Concern Most Voters
Poll Finds, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 14, 1998, at C04 (reporting that public
discontent about campaign finance practices is high); David Morgan, The
Handshake That Went Nowhere, SEATTLE TIMES, July 9, 1996, at B5 (describing
the discontent of both voters and legislators over campaign finance reform);
Ellen Nakashima, Campaign Spending Difficult to Reformn, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al (discussing public discontent with campaign
finance practices).
33. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (reciting cases
considering FECA regulations that control campaign finance practices). Various
states have enacted statutes to regulate campaign finance practices relating to
state elections. See, e.g., Public Campaign, News & Analysis, available at
http://www.publicampaign.org/news/newsmain.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2000) (describing a 1997 Vermont law limiting campaign contributions for
statewide candidates); Public Campaign, Press Advisory, available at
http://www.publicampaign.org/press-releases/pr6 12_00.html (last visited
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authority is continually challenged.3 4 The Court's most recent
examination of such a challenge is found in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC,35 which considered the validity of
36
state contribution limitations patterned after those upheld in
Buckley.37 In Nixon, a deeply divided court' ultimately followed
Buckley's precedent and upheld the Missouri limitations.3 9
Although the majority opinion set forth a routine application of
stare decisis,4 ° the concurring and dissenting opinions looked
beyond precedent and addressed the ineffectiveness of FECA
and the Court's role in rendering that legislation unworkable.'
Nixon is significant because it clearly illustrates the intractable
dissension that exists among the Justices regarding campaign
finance reform.4 2
Although most Justices agreed that the
current laws did not work,43 unanimity could not be reached
with regards to a solution.44 This division closely reflects the
Sept. 13, 2000) (reporting on the Clean Election Act enacted by Maine, in 1996,
which provided full public financing for political campaigns).
34. See, e.g., Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 241
(considering a challenge to the applicability of FECA regulations to expenditures
of a non-profit corporation); Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 197 (finding
corporations and unions may only solicit funds for segregated political funds
from members).
35. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
36. Id. at 382 (referring to the Missouri statute that limited campaign
contributions to a range between $250 and $1000 depending on the office
sought).
37. Id. (describing limitations imposed on contributions for state elected
office that, like the contribution limitation In Buckley, may not exceed $1000).
38. Id. at 381, 398, 399, 405, 410. Five of the nine Justices filed or joined
separate opinions in this case. Id.; see also infra note 43 and accompanying
text.
39. Id. at 397-98 ('There is no reason in logic or evidence to doubt the
sufficiency of Buckley to govern this case in support of the Missouri statute.").
40. See id. at 382 (holding "Buckley to be authority for comparable state
regulation").
41. See infra notes 209-59 and accompanying text (explaining the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Nixon).
42. See infra Part III.A (examining differences between the Justices).
43. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
considered the possibility that Buckley acts as an obstacle to "comprehensive
solutions to the problems posed by campaign finance."
Id. (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that "Buckley has not worked." Id. at 408
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concluded
that contribution limitations when analyzed under strict scrutiny are
unconstitutional. See id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 397 (arguing for no change in the status quo). Justice
Kennedy suggested that limitations on expenditures be treated similarly to
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sentiments of citizens 45 and politicians alike.4 6 Nearly everyone
agrees the system does not work, but still a consensus on a
workable solution remains elusive.4
Nixon also illustrates the Justices' varying opinions regarding
the appropriate role for the Supreme Court in such a highly
political matter. 48 The majority resisted appeals to overrule
Buckley for policy reasons by maintaining that the Court may
.only decide cases and controversies before it.4 9 Other Justices,
contribution limitations. See id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In contrast,
Justice Thomas advocated the use of less inclusive means, such as bribery and
disclosure laws, to regulate campaign financing. See id. at 428 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
45. See Public Campaign, New National Survey Shows Robust Support for
'Clean Money,' Full Public Financing of Elections (Apr. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.publicampaign.org/press-releases/pr4 3_00.html
(last visited
Sept. 13, 2000) (citing a national survey conducted by the Mellman Group in
early 2000, two-thirds of those polled supported comprehensive campaign
finance reform). Numerous systems have been adopted by the various states
including a total ban in Texas on contributions to candidates by labor unions,
regulatory industries and associations and a system in Maine that supports
public financing of political campaigns. See Reporter's Reference Center on
Campaign Finance Reform, State and Local Overview, available at
http://www.benton.org/neustadt/reporters/us.html
(last visited Sept. 13,
2000). Similar regulations were defeated by Californian voters. See Brookings
Inst., Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Regulation: Contribution &
Spending Limits, available at http://www.brook.edu/gs/cf/contrib.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2000) (reporting the defeat of Proposition 25, which proposed a
ban on corporate contributions and provided for public financing of political
campaigns).
46. See Thomas E. Mann, supra note 1, at 462, 464, 468. Politicians also
experienced difficulty in reaching consensus on a viable option to replace the
current system of campaign finance. See id. at 462. For example, the McCainFeingold bill would prohibit candidates from seeking funds not subject to FECA
contribution limits, but a bill proposed by Rep. John Doolittle (CA) would repeal
all current limitations on contributions. Id. at 464, 468.
47. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (analyzing the varied
opinions expressed by the Court). The Justices' philosophies and objectives
clash under the complexities of the issue, as is clearly evidenced in Nixon. See
id. Justice Thomas would overturn Buckley to protect contributions on much
the same level as restrictions on expenditures. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 412-13.
Justice Kennedy, however, would overturn Buckley so limitations on
expenditures could be imposed. See id. at 409.
48. See infra notes 204, 220, 244 (examining the varying opinions regarding
the appropriate level of involvement for the Court in this matter).
49. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397. Responding to criticism that the majority
avoided the "real issue" of campaign finance reform, Justice Souter argued for
the majority that "we are supposed to decide this case." Id. (emphasis added).
Justice Souter further noted that the petitioners "did not request that Buckley
be overruled; the furthest reach of their arguments about the law was that
subsequent decisions already on the books had enhanced the State's burden of
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such as Justice Kennedy, called for the Court to acknowledge
and address the larger issue involved, namely that the system as
implemented under Buckley does not work.5 °
This Note examines efforts to regulate campaign financing by
focusing on the various arguments for and against limitations on
contributions and expenditures. Part I of this Note reviews the
long history of legislative efforts to guard against corrupt
campaign financing practices and includes a detailed analysis of
FECA. Part I also examines Court decisions subsequent to the
enactment of FECA, primarily the Buckley decision, which have
altered FECA's provisions and legislative intent. Part II of this
Note considers recent political scandals, voter cynicism and the
latest efforts to reform the system. Part II also analyzes how the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Nixon detail the
different approaches to campaign finance reform advocated by
the Justices. Part III of this Note evaluates the relative merits of
the varying opinions and concludes that Justice Kennedy offers
the most realistic assessment of the current situation and
proposes the only solution bold enough to break the current
impasse over campaign finance reform.

I. A LONG

HISTORY OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

A. PriorLegislative Efforts to Reform CampaignFinance
Efforts by Congress to increase the fairness of the American
electoral process are not new. 51 Public concerns regarding the
escalating costs of campaigns and their financing by wealthy
individuals and interest groups have existed for over one
hundred years.52 Many of the campaign finance issues facing
legislators and courts today were considered by Congress in past
efforts to reform the electoral system.5 3
justification beyond what Buckley required, a proposition we have rejected as
mistaken." Id.
50. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for
"failing to acknowledge or evaluate the whole operation of the system that we
ourselves created in Buckley").
51. See infra notes 54, 58, 63, & 66 and accompanying text (describing
various congressional laws enacted to reform campaign finance regulations).
52. See Mann, supra note 1, at 451 (describing how during the Progressive
Era reform minded groups were concerned that large contributions were
corrupting political candidates).
53. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (examining various efforts to
reform campaign finance regulations).
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An early legislative effort aimed at the perceived threat of
corruption due to excessive contributions was the Tillman Act of
1907. 4 The Tillman Act prohibited contributions by banks and
corporations to candidates in federal elections. 5 Congress hoped
that its passage would satisfy the public demand to lessen the
influence of wealthy participants in the electoral process.5 6 The
actual impact of the legislation was diminished, however, by a
lack of enforcement 7
The next major effort to reduce the influence of money in
campaigns was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,58
which required the filing of detailed campaign finance
statements5 9 and imposed strict limitations upon expenditures
by candidates. 60 The effectiveness of the legislation was limited
however, by poor enforcement and the existence of numerous
61
exceptions.
Several years later, concerned that New Deal policies would
increase the political power of President Franklin Roosevelt,6
Congress imposed further restrictions on financing practices
with the enactment of the Hatch Act. 63

In addition to limiting

54. See Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 38 (describing the enactment
of the Tillman Act in 1907 as a response to allegations by muckraking
journalists and political pressures).
55. Corrado, supra note 11, at 27-28 (noting that the ban is still in effect
but is undermined by "soft money" loopholes).
56. Id. at 27 (explaining that Congress enacted the bill in response to public
sentiment for reform and at the urging of its namesake, Benjamin Tillman).
57. Mann, supra note 1, at 451 (attributing the law's failure to "gaping
loopholes," poor enforcement, and an uninformed public).
58. See Euchner & Maltese supra note 1 (describing this law as "the most
important finance legislation until 1971").
59. Corrado, supra note 11, at 29 (saying that the Act required political
committees, individuals, and candidates to provide, among other data, specific
information regarding contributions and itemized accounts for both
contributions and expenditures).
60. See id. (limiting spending in elections to $25,000 in the Senate and to
$5000 in the House of Representatives).
61. See Thayer, supra note 3, at 62-63 (describing the law as "more show
than substance"). A 1923 political commentator noted "that nowhere in the
country has there been devised a legal method of effectively limiting the amount
of money that may be spent in political fights. No law has been enacted
through which the politicians cannot drive a four-horse team." Id.
62. See Corrado, supra note 11, at 30 (discussing speculations by
Roosevelt's opponents that the newly expanded federal work force would
support Roosevelt).
63. Pub. L. No. 753, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified in scattered sections of 1,
5, 18 U.S.C.).
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total contributions and expenditures by a political party over a
one-year period,6 4 the Hatch Act prohibited federal employees
from soliciting funds for political campaigns.
Soon thereafter,
Congress moved to counter the increasing political power of
labor unions by enacting a provision within the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947,66 which prohibited the use of union treasury funds for
campaign contributions.
Despite Congress's attempts to address corruption, efforts at
reform were largely unsuccessful due to both noncompliance
and the lack of adequate enforcement.6 8 By the 1970s,
substantial increases in both the dollar amounts expended by
candidates and the voters' access to political information led to
the public's desire for a new solution. 9
B. FederalElection CampaignAct: Comprehensive Legislationfor
a System Gone Awry
FECA,7 0 enacted in 1972 and substantially revised in 1974,'

is

a comprehensive statute designed to significantly limit the
amount of money associated with federal elections.
The
American public's substantial distrust of politics and
government contributed to the enactment of FECA. 3 Prior to
FECA, the nature of political campaigns changed significantly
64. Corrado, supra note 11, at 30 (reciting the $3 million limit on the
amount a political party could receive or spend within a year).
65. Id. (noting that this restriction was an extension of the prohibition
originally established in the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 610.
67. See Corrado, supra note 11 (observing that the ban on labor union
funds has remained part of campaign regulation up to the present).
68. See Mann, supra note 1, at 451 (considering the problems contributing
to the failure of campaign finance regulations).
69. See Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 39 (noting that both political
spending and the average American's exposure to television advertising rose
during the period from 1952 to 1968).
70. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
71. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). The Watergate scandal of
1972 moved Congress to amend FECA in 1974. See Mann, supra note 1, at
451.
72. See Mann, supra note 1, at 451-52 (noting that FECA set limits on
individual contributions, the amount of personal wealth a candidate could
expend, and imposing limits on total campaign expenditures).
73. Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that the 1974
amendments to FECA were enacted during a period of public discontent over
the Watergate scandal).
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with the advent and proliferation of the television.74 Television
made it possible for a candidate to reach far more voters with a
thirty-second television advertisement than through traditional
outlets.75 The desire to buy effective but expensive air-time led
to increased

campaign costs. 7 6

Between

1964 and

1968,

campaign spending increased from $200 to $300 million. With
the enactment of FECA, Congress hoped to decrease the
influence of money in elections78 and restore Americans'
confidence in government, which was seriously shaken by the
Watergate scandal in 1974-1975.
As originally enacted, FECA instituted a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to administer matters of federal campaign
finance. ° Among its many provisions, the statute required full
74. See Mann, supra note 1, at 461: Corrado, supra note 11, at 31. An
excellent example of the visual impact television afforded a political candidate
was the Nixon-Kennedy debate of 1960. See GIL TROY, SEE How THEY RAN: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 210-11 (1996). Troy describes
this landmark debate as follows: "Political folklore tells how the tanned, athletic
Kennedy surmounted the stature gap and won the election*... Nixon was 'half
slouched, his 'Lazy Shave' powder faintly streaked with sweat, his eyes
exaggerated hollows of blackness, his jaws, jowls, and face drooping with
strain."' Id.
75. See Troy, supra note 74, at 198 (explaining that during the 1952
presidential campaign, candidate Adlai Stevenson was able to reach twice the
audience he had with radio by addressing the public on television).
76. See Corrado, supra note 11, at 31 (describing television as "an essential
means of political communication").
77. Jeffrey M. Berry & Jerry Goldman, Congress and Public Policy: A Study
of the FederalElection Campaign Act of 1971, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 331, 334
(1973) (noting that this dramatic increase in spenaing brought about serious
consideration by Congress of the growing problem of campaign finance).
78. Euchner & Maltese, supra note 1, at 39 (describing Congress's intent to
"reduce what was seen as the insidious influences of private money").
79. See TROY, supra note 74, at 223 (stating that the Nixon scandal, in
addition to other factors such as Vice-President Spiro Agnew's indictment and
the legacy of sixties counter-culture, lead Americans to "yearn[] for an electoral
overhaul").
80. See Mann, supra note 1, at 451-52 (noting that FECA continued
prohibitions on corporate and union funds, limited the use of a candidate's
family wealth, limited contributions by individuals and political parties during a
campaign, imposed caps on total spending by a candidate and also independent
expenditures made on behalf of a candidacy, strengthened disclosure laws and
enforcement provisions, established the Federal Election Commission and
instituted the Presidential Election Campaign Fund to provide public funding
for presidential elections).
The comprehensive nature of the law was also
recognized by the California appellate court considering Buckley, "[tihis case
presents for review the latest, and by far the most comprehensive, reform
legislation passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-
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disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, 8 '
provided for public financing of presidential campaigns, and
established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to oversee
implementation of the law.8 3 Although all of these provisions
were intended to promote fairer, less costly elections, 8 4 the
regulations with the greatest and most immediate impact were
85
those

limiting

campaign

contributions

and

expenditures.

Specifically, FECA limited political contributions "by an
individual or a group to $1,000 and by a political committee to
$5,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall
annual limitation of $25,000 " 86 and limited expenditures "by
individuals

or

groups...

to $1,000

per

candidate.",7

In

addition, FECA restricted a candidate's ability to personally
finance his own campaign and created a cap on permissible
expenditures by candidates during primary and general
elections. 9
President and members of Congress." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
81. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (1975) (requiring in part, each candidate or
committee supporting a candidate to "file with the Commission reports of
receipts and expenditures on forms to be prescribed or approved").
82. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1975) (creating the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund, providing public matching funds for qualified
candidates, financed through revenue donated on individual tax returns in the
amount of $1 per individual filing).
83. 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (establishing the Federal Election Commission, the
organization primarily responsible for enforcement of all FECA provisions).
84. See Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting
Congress's purposes for the FECA were "to limit spending in federal election
campaigns and to eliminate the actual or perceived pernicious influence over
candidates for elective office that wealthy individuals or corporations could
achieve by financing the 'political warchests' of those candidates").
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (limiting contributions by individuals to federal
candidates to $1000); 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (restricting aggregate contributions
by an individual to $25,000 per year); 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (imposing expenditure
limitations on federal candidates).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (limiting contributions by political committees to
federal candidates to $5000 per election).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (restricting expenditures made by an Individual or
group "to a clearly Identified candidate during a calendar year which, when
added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year
advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000").
88. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (enacting limitations on the amount of personal and
family funds a candidate could expend In a campaign). The relative limits
varied depending on the office sought. Id.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (imposing expenditure limitations on candidates
that varied according to the office sought).
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C. The Court Changes the Rules: Buckley v. Valeo and Its
Progeny-Varying Levels of ConstitutionalProtectionFor
Contributionsand Expenditures
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered a major challenge to
the constitutional validity of FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.90 In
Buckley, several .candidates and political organizations
challenged FECA claiming that the contribution and expenditure
limitations violated the First Amendment protections of free
The Court began its analysis by
speech and association. 1
noting that political contributions and expenditures both
qualified as political speech governed by the First Amendment.92
The Court concluded that although both acts were forms of
political speech, they were not entitled to the same degree of
protection.9 3 According to the Court, limitations on expenditures
represented a substantial restraint on speech because it directly
reduced the quantity of expression afforded. 4 In contrast, the
contribution limitations were only a "marginal restriction" upon
the contributor's right of expression and were thus more
amenable to reasonable restraints9
90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (challenging four major provisions of the
law namely, limitations on contributions and expenditures, disclosure
requirements, establishment of the Presidential Campaign Fund and those
provisions creating the Federal Election Commission).
91. Id. at 11 (arguing that methods of modem communication demand the
expenditure of money, thus limitations restrict speech).
92. Id. at 14 (reflecting upon the importance of open political discussion
and debate to the vitality of American government). The Court noted that
political debate is essential in a system that is dependent upon the awareness
and judgment of its citizenry. Id. The Court acknowledged the national
commitment to the "principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open." Id.
93. Id. at 23.
94. See id. at 19 (addressing the direct correlation between money spent
and communication conveyed). The Court conceded that virtually all political
communication required some outlay of money, such as printing expenses for
handbills and rentals fees for speech halls. See id. It determined that an
expenditure restriction "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
the size of the audience reached." Id.
95. See id. at 20-21 (concluding that contribution limitations were
marginally restrictive because they did not directly restrict the contributor's
ability to communicate his support for a candidate). The Court reasoned that a
contribution, of either $10 or $10,000, acted as a general expression of support.
See id. As such, a cap on the amount an individual or group could contribute
did not prevent that symbolic act or support. See id. at 21. The Court further
concluded that limitations would not reduce political activity, but would instead
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Because FECA imposed restrictions on protected speech, the
Court applied what it identified as "exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment. ''96 The Court ultimately upheld the
contribution limitations, stating that the government's interest
in reforming the electoral financing system was "sufficiently
important, ,97 and that the contribution limitations were "closely
drawn" to meet those interests without silencing free speech. 9
Consequently, such restrictions only involved a marginal
restraint on political communication.9 9 The Court explained that
"the quantity of communication by the contributor does not
require candidates to seek financial assistance from a broader base of
contributors and would compel individuals to fund their own direct political
expression. See id. at 21-22.
96. Id. at 16. The Court never clearly defined what was demanded by the
"exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment," and it subsequently
altered its reference to this scrutiny throughout the opinion. See id. The Court
later referred to the standard imposed as the "closest scrutiny" under which a
state must demonstrate a sufficiently important interest and closely drawn
means. Id. at 25. The Court again altered its terms when it described the
judicial scrutiny as a "rigorous standard of review" which requires "weighty
interest[s] ... sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment
freedoms .... " Id. at 29. Justice Thomas labels the scrutiny applied as "the
sui generis Buckley's standard of scrutiny," a deviation from the traditional test
employed in free speech cases. See id.at 923. The vagueness regarding the
level of scrutiny employed by the Court in its decision has brought much
criticism and is often the foundation of arguments calling for the overruling of
Buckley. See generally Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,
518 U.S. 604 (1996). Justice Thomas, dissenting in Colorado Republican,
maintained that the analytical framework utilized in Buckley was deeply flawed.
Id. at 640 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29-30. The government put forth two additional
justifications for the limitations. See id. First, to limit the relative voice of
wealthy individuals and groups in order to equalize the voice of all citizens and
also to retard skyrocketing campaign costs. Id. The Court rejected both of
these interests. Id. It found that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
" Id. at 48-49. The Court
also rejected the interest in slowing campaign costs as a basis for such
limitations. See id. at 57.
98. Id. at 25 (maintaining that the limitations were a valid response to
possible corrupting influences of large contributions). The Court held further
that the amount of the limitation cap was a legislative, not judicial, matter. See
id. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a court "has no scalpel to
probe whether ... a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." Id. at
30. The Court considered the expressive speech to be the act of contributing
rather than the actual words later spoken by the candidate. Id. at 20.
99. See id. at 20-21 (finding contribution limitations to be marginally
restrictive because the contributor was able to express himself politically
through other means, such as discussions with others regarding issues and the
candidates).
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increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution."'0 0
Because the statute did not prohibit all contributions, but
merely limited the amounts, the Court found FECA's marginal
restraint of expression acceptable.10 '
In contrast to contribution limitations, the Court found the
restrictions on expenditures to be unconstitutional. 102 The Court
characterized these limitations as "direct and substantial
0 4
restraints ''03 on speech and, therefore, unconstitutional.'
Unlike contributions, in which the quantity of expression does
not increase in proportion to the amount contributed, 0 5 the
Court reasoned that limitations 6on expenditures directly impair
the quantity of political speech.

Despite its 107•ruling, the 10Court was far from unified on the
holdings. 107 Five justices,0 8 including Chief Justice Burger, filed
separate opinions with each member joining in part and
dissenting in part. The opinions covered the spectrum of

100. Id. at 21. Unlike expenditures where less money necessarily equals less
communication, a restriction on the amount an individual may contribute does
not necessarily limit the quality of a contributor's communication. See id.at
19-21.
101. Id. at 20-22 (noting the limitations restricted actual contributions but
not the potential for political activity by a contributor).
102. Id. at 58-59 (concluding that expenditure limitations "place substantial
and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to
engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment
cannot tolerate").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 58. The Court also indicated that limitations, although content
neutral with regards to the communication expressed, were still
unconstitutional due to their stifling effect on core political expression. See id.
at 39.
105. See id.at 21 (explaining that "[tihe quantity of communication by the
contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since
the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing").
106. See id. at 19 (finding that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached").
107. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (examining the Justices'
varied opinions regarding the applicability of limitations on contributions and
expenditures).
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235, 257, 286, 290. Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White, Justice Marshall, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Blackmun all filed
separate opinions. Id.
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Justices White'0 9 and Marshall asserted the need for

expenditure limits. ""
Chief Justice Burger argued against
contribution
limits. 11
Justice
Blackmun,
meanwhile,
maintained that it was impossible to make a proper distinction
between a contribution and an expenditure."1 2 Though most

could

agree

that

various

provisions

within

FECA

were

113

impermissible and in need of revision,
a consensus on what
would represent a valid replacement proved elusive." 4 Despite
the lack of consensus, Buckley significantly altered the structure
of campaign finance regulation from that originally intended by
Congress. 5
109. See id. at 264-65 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(maintaining expenditure limitations are a necessary reinforcement of
contribution caps and will help to dispel the public's impression "that federal
elections are purely and simply a function of money").
110. See id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing specifically for limitations on the amounts a candidate may spend from
personal funds).
Justice Marshall contended that such a limitation is
necessary to lessen the financial advantage a wealthy candidate would hold
over a less affluent opponent. See id.
111. Id. at 235 (finding the infringement upon First Amendment rights by
limits on campaign contributions to be equal to those imposed by expenditure
restrictions). Additionally, Justice Burger argues that "[bly dissecting the Act
bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to recognize that the whole
of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts." Id.
112. Id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(attributing his dissent in various sections of the Court's ruling to his doubts
that the Court can make a principled distinction between contribution and
expenditure limitations).
113. See id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating his disapproval of contribution limitations, public financing of
presidential elections and the disclosure provisions). Justice Blackmun voiced
his opposition to expenditure limitations based on his belief that there is no real
distinction between contributions and expenditures. See id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (reciting various opinions
put forth by the Justices).
115. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the original
structure of FECA).
The Buckley decision altered FECA's structure by
prohibiting limitations on expenditures. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52. In
addition, the Court found that the composition of the Federal Election
Commission violated the Appointments Clause and was thus unconstitutional.
Id. at 143. However, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund, as well as the disclosure provisions of the law. Id. at
143. Chief Justice Burger feared the Court had altered FECA too extensively,
stating that, "Congress intended to regulate all aspects of federal campaign
finances, but what remains after today's holding leaves no more than a shadow
of what Congress intended. I question whether the residue leaves a workable
program." Id. at 236.
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Four years after Buckley, the Court again considered the
constitutionality of FECA in California Medical Association v.
FEC. 1 6 The decision focused on the validity of a FECA provision
that prohibited individuals from contributing more than $5000
to a multi-candidate political committee.1 7 The California
Medical Association (CMA) maintained that the restriction was
not merely a limitation on contributions but, in fact, an
unconstitutional expenditure limitation because it prevented the
medical association from expressing its views through its
political action committee (PAC)." 8 In the CMA's view, the PAC
was not an independent organization but rather an integral and
invaluable arm of the medical association."19 The CMA further
argued that even if a donation to its PAC was properly classified
as a contribution, FECA was still unconstitutional because the
donation • .was
internal and not directed outside the
120
organization.
The CMA reasoned that the risk of "actual or
apparent corruption of the political process" did not exist
because the association was giving money to its own PAC, not to
a candidate for public office.' 2' Thus the substantial interest
that justified the limitation in Buckley 122 was not present in this
123
case.
116. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (considering a constitutional challenge to FECA
provisions that limit contributions by associations to those made by political
action committees).
117. Id. at 183 (referring to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976)). In California
Medical, the plaintiff was a physician's association that wished to contribute
funds to its political action committee, called the "California Medical Political
Action Committee (CALPAC)." Id. at 185.
118. See id. at 195 (challenging the classification of funds as contributions
rather than expenditures, arguing that CALPAC was in actuality disseminating
CMA's political speech and thus money transferred to that organization should
be classified an expenditure).
119. See id. (maintaining that CMA directly conveyed its political speech
through CALPAC). Appellant argued that "this is the manner in which CMA has
chosen to engage in political speech." Id. at 196.
120. See id. (noting that funds were not being directed to an entity wholly
independent of CMA, but instead to the political action committee formed to
pursue its political interests).
121. See id. at 196-97 (maintaining that the justification for limitations,
preventing corruption or the appearance thereof within the electoral process,
does not exist in a case such as this, where an organization is funding its own
speech and not that of an independent candidate).
122. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26 (noting that the only justification
sufficient to impose restrictions upon contributions is the threat or appearance
of corruption).
123. See California Medical, 453 U.S. at 195 (arguing that corruption or the
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The Court ultimately rejected the CMA's characterization of
PAC donations as expenditures rather than contributions.'2 4
The Court labeled the expression "speech by proxy" 2 ' and
concluded that under Buckley, contribution limitations imposed
on this type of communication were valid. 26 As in Buckley, the
restrictions were marginal in scope and appropriate to further
the government's substantial interest. 127
Six months after CaliforniaMedical, the Court considered the
constitutionality of contribution limitations imposed by a
municipal government in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley.12 In Berkeley, the issue was whether a city ordinance
that restricted to $250 individual contributions to a "committee
formed to support or oppose ballot measures"' 129 was

appearance of corruption did not exist In this case because both parties, CMA
and CALPAC, were the same entity).
124. Id. at 195 (concluding the disbursements CMA made to CALPAC could
not be characterized as independent expenditures and thus were not eligible for
protection as such). The Court held that nothing "limits the amount CMA or
any of its members may independently expend in order to advocate political
views; rather, the statute restrains only the amount that CMA may contribute."
Id.
125. Id. at 196. "Speech by proxy" refers to a situation when an individual,
rather than speaking directly on an issue, expresses his views through the
communications of another. See id. at 197.
126. Id. at 196-97 The Court determined that "speech by proxy" was "not the
sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First
Amendment protection." Id. at 196.
127. See id. at 198-99 (reasoning that limitations upon contributions made
to multi-candidate committees such as CMA, are necessary to prevent
individuals and groups from evading other statutory caps on contributions).
The Court contended that without the limitation imposed on CMA, contributors
would circumvent the $1000 cap on individual contributions to candidates by
donating higher amounts to "multicandidate" PACs. See id. at 198.
128. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). Both the state Superior Court and the California
Court of Appeals found a city ordinance unconstitutional, which restricted to
$250 the amount an individual could contribute to "committee[s] formed to
support or oppose ballot measures." Id. at 291-93. The California Supreme
Court reversed these lower holdings, however, concluding that the infringement
of First Amendment rights caused by the ordinance was outweighed by the
compelling governmental interests in guarding against corruption or the
appearance thereof. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 167
Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. 1980).
129. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 291. The ordinance provided that "'[n]o
person shall make, and no campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any
contribution which will cause the total amount contributed by such person with
respect to a single election in support of or in opposition to a measure to exceed
two hundred and fifty dollars ($250)."' Id. at 292.
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constitutional. Employing an "exacting judicial review," 130 the
Court weighed the contributor's constitutional right to free
speech against the government's compelling interest in enacting
Unlike previous decisions, 132 the Berkeley
the ordinance. 13
Court concluded that the city's interest was "insubstantial" and
unable to warrant restraints on speech. 133 The Court reasoned
that contributions to support or oppose an initiative were much
less likely to lead to 34corruption than were contributions to an
individual candidate.

35
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a specific FECA
provision relating to expenditures by political parties in general
elections.13
Under the Party Expenditure Provision, political
parties were exempted from the $5000 limit on contributions to
political candidates. 37 The parties were governed, however, by a
substitute limitation that varied by state and was determined

130. Id. at 294.
131. See id. at 295-98 (referring to a contributor's right to finance a message
he supports and the city's interest in preventing corruption with the ballot
measure process).
132. See supra notes 97 & 122 and accompanying text (noting the
acceptance in Buckley of the state's interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance within the electoral system).
133. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 298.
134. See id. at 296-98 (finding that "'[tihe risk of corruption perceived in
cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a
public issue"' (citations omitted)).
135. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
136. Id. at 608 (discussing the "Party Expenditure Provision," an exception to
the general limitation on contributions and expenditures by political parties).
Expenditures by a party or individual, spent in coordination with a political
candidate were considered "indirect contributions" and subject to FECA
contribution limitations. Id. at 611. Coordinated expenditures were defined as
"expenditures made.., in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or
their agents." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994). Some attribute the high price
tag and scandals of the 1996 presidential election to the Court's decision that
year. See Bruce Buchanan, The Presidency and the Nominating Process, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 251, 255-56 (Michael Nelson ed., 5th ed.

1998) (speculating that the decision in Colorado Republican Campaign
Committee v. FEC "opened the money floodgates even wider, permitting parties
to solicit donations directly from rich individuals and corporations").
137. See id. at 610-11 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441 (d)(1) which states:
"[nlotwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on
expenditures

or

limitations

on

contributions

....

political

party

[committees]... may make expenditures in connection with the general
election campaign of candidates for Federal office ....").
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based on the voting age population of the state. 13 In Colorado
Republican, the Colorado Republican Party challenged the Party
Expenditure Provision as unconstitutional. 139 A divided Court
held that the FECA regulation did indeed violate the
Constitution as applied. 40 Although the provision regulated
expenditures spent in coordination with a political candidate,
the Court determined that the provision was not applicable to
expenditures that were independent in nature. 14' The Court
concluded that political parties were entitled to the same
protection afforded individuals
or private groups making
42
independent expenditures. 1

II.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION TODAY

A. Corruption,Cynicism, and the McCain-FeingoldBill: The
138. See id, at 611 (calculating the substitute expenditure limitation in a
senatorial campaign as "the greater of $20,000 or '2 cents multiplied by the
voting age population of the State').
139. See id. at 612.
140. Id. at 613. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part. Id. at 626. Although he supported the Court's decision, Justice Kennedy
argued that both coordinated and independent expenditures should receive
First Amendment protection. See id. The candidate, he reasoned, is just a
communicator of the party's message and it is, therefore, unrealistic to view
their expenditures separately. Id. at 629-30. Consequently, limitations barring
candidate expenditures should likewise bar those made by political parties. See
id. at 630. Justice Thomas, also joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but dissenting in part. Id.
at 631.
Justice Thomas argued for the abandonment of the framework
established in Buckley, reasoning that under strict scrutiny, all expenditure
and contribution limitations are unconstitutional. See id. at 640-41. According
to Justice Thomas, "[a] contribution is simply an indirect expenditure; though
contributions and expenditures may thus differ in form, they do not differ in
substance." Id. at 638. Lastly, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
offered a dissenting opinion. Id. at 648. He contended that all expenditures by
political parties, coordinated or independent, are, in fact, contributions and as
such should be subject to contribution limitations. Id. Justice Stevens relied
on the state's interest in preventing corruption and the circumvention of other
contribution limitations to support his opinion. See id. at 648-49. He further
embraced an interest that Buckley lacked, namely, the "leveling [ofl the electoral
playing field by constraining the cost of federal campaigns." Id. at 649.
141. See id. at 615. The Court grounds its reasoning in the varying levels of
constitutional protection afforded contributions and expenditures first set out
in Buckley. See id. at 614-15.
142. Id. at 618 (questioning "how a Constitution that grants to individuals,
candidates, and ordinary political committees the right to make unlimited
independent expenditures could deny the same right to political parties").

20011

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

839

Current State of CampaignFinanceRegulation
The Supreme Court has consistently held that First
Amendment rights may only be infringed to further a compelling
state interest. 4 3 To date the only interest found to be compelling
with regard to campaign finance is the prevention of corruption
14
or the appearance of corruption in the electoral process.
Limitations on campaign contributions are repeatedly upheld in
the name of this compelling interest. 45 Despite these efforts,
corruption within the electoral process continues to flourish,
46
with numerous scandals reported over the past two decades.
One such scandal, uncovered during the late 1980s, involved
five
U.S.
Senators
charged
with
accepting
prohibited
4
contributions in exchange for political considerations.1 Over on
million dollars in contributions were made to various Senators
by Charles Keating, manager of the failed Lincoln Savings and

143. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(requiring all government imposed racial classifications to be reviewed under
strict scrutiny which requires a compelling state interest to infringe upon a
constitutional right); Department of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (requiring the state to demonstrate a
compelling government interest to infringe upon claimant's use of peyote for
alleged religious practices).
144. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976) (per curiam) (relying on
the government's weighty interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption attributable to large contributions); see also FEC v. Nat'l
Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (finding the only compelling
interest to infringe upon a First Amendment right is the prevention of
corruption or its appearance); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981) (identifying the only compelling interest justifying
infringement upon First Amendment rights as that relating to "the perception of
undue influence of large contributors to a candidate").
145. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143 (finding FECA limitations on contributions
to be constitutionally valid); California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201
(1981) (upholding restrictions limiting contributions to PACs).
146. See CHARLES LEWIS, THE BUYING OF CONGRESS: How SPECIAL INTERESTS
HAVE STOLEN YOUR RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 16-17

(1998) (considering various political scandals involving contributions and
improprieties by various politicians). Two instances of corruption were revealed
within days of each other in 1989. See id. House Majority Whip Tony Coelho
resigned amid revelations of an improper bond arrangement extended to him by
a savings and loan operator. Id. Several days later, Speaker of the House Jim
Wright resigned following disclosure of his inappropriate financial transactions
with a lobby group. Id.
147. See id. at 17 (noting that Democratic Senators Alan Cranston (CA),
Dennis DeConcini (AZ), John Glenn (OH), Donald Riegle Jr. (MI), and
Republican Senator John McCain (AZ) were charged with improper conduct).
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Loan Association. 148 The Senate ultimately found these
donations improper. 49 When asked by reporters whether he
thought his contributions improperly influenced the five
" "o Alan
senators, Keating responded, "I certainly hope so.'
Cranston of California, one of the Senators reprimanded,
defended
his conduct by blaming campaign
finance
regulations-" [tihe present
system
makes
it virtually
impossible.., to avoid what some will assert is a conflict of
interest... how many of you [Senators] ... could rise and
declare you have never, ever helped-or agreed to help-a
contributor close in time to the solicitation or receipt of a
contribution?" 15' He implied it was the system, not him, that
was corrupt.
Each of the five Senators
was subsequently
52
reprimanded for unethical conduct.'
Later in the mid-1990s, then Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich was accused of improprieties relating to his
53
involvement with a conservative political group, GOPAC.1
Although GOPAC was originally touted as an educational
organization, its purpose was in fact to promote the conservative
political agenda of its members. 54 In the process of soliciting
large contributions for this organization, Gingrich violated
5 5 For his actions, the Speaker
various campaign regulations.'
56
was fmed $300,000.1

Larger than both the Keating Five and Gingrich scandals are
those associated with Bill Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign
and his departing presidential pardons.'57 Numerous charges of
148. See id. (disclosing the total amount of contributions given to be
approximately $1.4 million, eighty percent of which constituted "soft money").
149. See id.
150. Id. Charles Keating was imprisoned for his involvement in defrauding
customers of his failed Savings and Loan. Id.
151. Id.

152.

See id. (noting that Senator Cranston received the harshest reprimand).

153.

See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-

RAISING'S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 46-47 (2000) (noting Newt
Gingrich's control of the organization and its transformation from an
educational association to a more politically active entity).
154. Id. (describing GOPAC's transformation from an organization designed

to groom future Republican candidates to a "money machine").
155.

See id. (describing how Congressman Gingrich subverted regulations by

maintaining GOPAC was an educational organization when it, in fact, was a
partisan political machine).
156. LEWIS, supra note 146, at 19.

157. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 153, at 47 (contending that "[no one...
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impropriety were brought against both the President and Vice
President with regards to their fundraising practices. 5
The
charges against the President included "renting out" the Lincoln
Bedroom to large contributors, soliciting donations from foreign
nationals, having "coffees" with large contributors, and diverting
millions of dollars from the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) to the President's election campaign.' 59 President Clinton
was also accused of coordinating directly with the DNC in the
financing and production of his presidential campaign
advertisements, 16 in1 direct
violation of the law as determined in
6
Colorado Republican. '

Equally scandalous was the presidential pardon of fugitive
financier Marc Rich. 62 Rich, who fled the country and avoided
prosecution in the U.S. courts for seventeen years,163 was
went as far as Bill Clinton" when it came to violating campaign finance
regulations). See also Robert L. Jackson & Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Atty.
Launches Inquiry on Rich Case Law: Prosecutorin New York Reportedly Decides
to Investigate if Clinton's Pardon of Broker Was the Result of Illegal Merits, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2001, at Al (describing the "176 pardons and commutations,"
which included that for fugitive financier Marc Rich).
158. LEWIS, supra note 146, at 20 (listing numerous campaign finance
violations attributed to President Clinton's fundraising efforts and referring to
him as a "'flawed vessel' on the subject of integrity in government and keeping
an arm's length from special interests").
159. Id. (analyzing campaign financing practices associated with what the
author refers to as "the most expensive and possibly the most corrupt [election]
in U.S. history").
160. See David A. Pepper, Article, Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the
Court's Issue Advocacy Standards, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 141, 162 (1997)
(examining the President's participation in DNC presidential campaign
advertisements). President Clinton is described as the "day-to-day operational
director of our [DNC] TV ad campaign," and it is reported that he held direct
meetings with "top DNC officials discussing the strategy and content of the
ads"). Id.
161. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,
617 (1996) (finding the "constitutionally significant fact" in determining whether
funds are independent in nature and free of limitations or subject to regulation
as contributions is whether the candidate has coordinated efforts with the
organization). According to Colorado Republican, if the parties have worked in
coordination then the funds are considered contributions and are subject to
FECA limitations. See id.
162. See Mike Doming, House Panel Grills Clinton Official Pardon for
Financier Skipped Review by Justice Prosecutors,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2001, at A3
(reporting the pardon of Marc Rich, who was listed on the FBI's Ten Most
Wanted List for "the largest tax evasion scheme in U.S. history" and for "trading
with Iran during the hostage crisis in violation of U.S. sanctions").
163. See U.S. Atty., supra note 157 (noting that Rich lived as a fugitive in
Switzerland to "avoid[] prosecution in New York").
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granted a pardon months after his former wife gave "roughly $1
million in contributions to Democratic candidates" including
"$450,000 to Clinton's presidential library fund.' ' 4 Numerous
politicians were quick to publicly note the corrupt appearance of
the situation 65 including former Clinton Labor Secretary, Robert
Reich, who stated "if there ever was an argument for campaign
finance reform, this is it."' 66 The prevalence and magnitude of

political scandals such as these makes it evident that current
financing regulations, which evolved from Buckley and its
67
progeny, fail to prevent corruption within the electoral process.
Existing campaign finance regulations failed to prevent the
appearance of corruption within the electoral process and the
voter disenchantment that accompanies it. Newspapers and
magazines abound with articles and commentaries discussing
the average American's disgust and disinterest with politics and
voting.1 8

Former U.S. Senator, Presidential candidate and

reform proponent, Bill Bradley, once stated that "money is to
politics what acid is to cloth-it eats away at the fabric of
6 9
Democracy.'
Archibald Cox, constitutional law expert and
164. Id.
165. See id. (quoting several outraged politicians, such as Sen. Dianne
Feinstein (D-Ca.) who voiced "concerns not only about the Rich pardon but
about a number of others" and Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) who maintained
the Clinton pardons made a "mockery of the system").
166. See Fox News: The Edge With Paula Zahn (FOX television broadcast,
Jan. 24, 2001) (responding to questions regarding whether the Rich pardon was
influenced by large political contributions). Secretary Reich referred bluntly to
the corrupt appearance of the transaction: "it smells bad and it looks bad." Id.
167. See supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text (examining numerous
instances of political corruption within the past two decades).
168. See, e.g., Jeff Barker, McCain Adamant on Campaign Finance, ARiz.
REPUBLIC, July 1, 1999, at 1 (reporting John McCain's positions on campaign
finance reform and quoting Arizona Representative Kathleen Flora's opinion
that "'[a] lot of people are feeling cynical or disenchanted with government
today") Aaron Bernstein, Too Much Corporate Power?, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 11,
2000, at 144 (examining public distrust of large corporations and their
influence on politics): Peter D. Cimini, Address the Scandal of Campaign
Finance, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 6, 1999, at A16 (referring to polls that show
the public thinks the system is corrupt).
169.

See BILL BRADLEY, THE JOURNEY FROM HERE 84 (2000). Senator Bradley

recalled experiences on the Senate Finance Committee when public meetings
involving interests important to specific groups were aligned with special
interest lobbyists while other meetings regarding issues of general welfare were
virtually unattended. See id. at 86. He found that money seriously distorts the
principle of "one person ... one vote" and concluded that those with more
money have more political clout. Id. at 87.
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former Watergate prosecutor, also voiced his concerns regarding
the current regulations and maintains that "campaign finance
abuses are far worse today than during Watergate." 7 °
Numerous polls indicate cynicism is widespread among voters,
particularly among the young.17' Many attribute this high level
of distrust among voters to their perception that the political
system is corrupt. 72 It is clearly evident that current campaign
170. CHARLES LEWIS, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT 2000 5 (2000) (reporting
comments made by Archibald Cox in an interview) Mr. Cox also concluded that
Americans have "much less trust in government today than there was during
the Watergate years").
171. See Meredith Kruse & Ian Zack, Poll: Campaign Funds Concern Voters,
VA. PILOT, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al (reporting on a 1999 poll indicating that voters
believe money improperly influences politicians). This poll conducted in 1999
by The Old Dominion University's Social Science Research Center, reported that
"half of all voters think state legislators' votes are for sale" and that "[oinly three
out of ten people think that their representative has a high ethical standard."
Id. In addition, eighty-three percent of Virginia voters polled thought too much
money was spent on campaigns. Id.; see also Alexa Aguilar, Southern Illinois U.:
Elusive Young Voters Could Swing Election, U-WIRE, Sept. 7, 2000, available at
2000 WL 24492243 (referring to poll showing disinterest in the election by
voters aged eighteen through twenty-four). This poll conducted that same year
by Project Vote Smart, found that "24 percent of all potential voters aged 18-24
did not trust any level of government, with only 9 percent claiming they trusted
the federal government." Id. The author noted that student participation in
elections is low and cited statistics for a predominantly student precinct
showing only eleven percent of those registered actually voted in 1998. Id.
Despite efforts that targeted specifically at mobilizing this age group, such as
MTV's "Choose or Lose," "Rap the Vote," and the "WWF Smackdown Your Vote!,"
many students feel disconnected from the process. Id.; see also Kathryn E.
Smith, U. Southern Mississippi: Apathy Among Young Voters Alive Despite
Upcoming Election, U-WIRE, Aug. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24490193
(noting results of poll showing people aged eighteen through twenty-four are
voting in smaller numbers).
172. See Kruse & Zack, supra note 171, at Al (citing various opinions
regarding corruption within the system). Old Dominion University Professor
Stephen K. Medvic concluded that voter cynicism "begins to show a corrupting
effect of money on our society." Id. A state delegate from Arlington, Virginia,
Robert H. Brink, voiced his concern that "campaigns are getting so expensive
and negative that we've driven participation and faith in the system down and
down in a downward spiral." Id. at A1O. Finally, a private contractor stated his
opinion that "people are buying what they want with these large campaign
contributions." Id. at Al; see also Smith, supra note 171 and accompanying
text (relaying the conclusion of University of Southern Mississippi Professor
Ronald Marquardt that "young voters often cite corruption [and] big money" as
reasons for not voting); Diane Carman, It's Back to "Reform" School, DEN. POST,
Jan. 4, 2000, at BI (concluding that "[tihe corruption of the process by big
money has alienated a whole generation of young voters who see participation
in the democratic process as an insulting waste of time"). There are indications
that some voters feel differently as was cited in a DetroitNews article discussing
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finance regulations are failing to prevent the appearance of

corruption within the electoral process. '
In response to the failure of current campaign finance
regulations, numerous alternatives to FECA were proposed or
enacted. 174 Thus far the greatest success is found at the state
and local levels. 175 Several states including Maine and Arizona,
implemented public financing programs for all general
campaigns. 76 New York City instituted a matching fund7 program
7
for all candidates who abide by expenditure limitations.
Efforts to reform federal regulations did not find similar
success. 78 One of the most visible legislative efforts to pass
a nationwide poll that finds "Americans are more moderate.., less cynical
about government and more supportive of Democratic positions" than they were
five years earlier. Will Lester, Voters More Moderate, Less Angry: Poll Reveals
Mood Shift in Political Landscape From Distrust of 1994, DET. NEWS, Nov. 12,

1999, at A7. The lowest voter turnout ever for a Presidential election was
reported in 1996, with only half of eligible voters participating. LEWIS, supra
note 146, at 9. Although Americans are not expressing their views at the ballot
box, they are venting their frustrations through other means. Citizens in
California, for example, demonstrated at the state capital to protest the alleged
influence large contributors held over the Governor's environmental policies.
See Fund Raising By California Governor is Criticized, Even By His Own Party,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 2000, at A13. A ninety-year-old woman,
"Granny D," walked from coast to coast in support of public financing for
elections. Abby Schier, Cleaning Up Politics, Clearing Out Big Money, DOLLARS &
SENSE, July/Aug. 2000, at 24. Many citizens have expressed their anger and
distrust over the electoral system through Letters to the Editor. See, e.g.,
Barbara C. Lea, Letters to the Editor Already Cynical Voters More Turned Off by
Ads, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 7, 2000 (admonishing politicians for running

negative advertisements and vowing to refrain from watching television until
after November 7, 2000).
173. See supra notes 168-71 (discussing the public's perception that
politicians in general are corrupt).
174. See Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 2000, S. 2565,
106th Cong. (2000) (proposing reducing PAC limitations, restricting out-of-state
donations to Senators, and prohibiting non-citizens from making contributions);
Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 965, 105th Cong. (1997)
(proposing elimination of contribution limitations and the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund and increasing disclosure requirements).
175. See infra notes 176, 177 (describing several successful campaign
finance reforms instituted at the state and local levels).
176. See BRADLEY, supra note 169, at 92 (describing public financing
systems that provide public funds for candidates willing to forego private
donations). In addition to Maine and Arizona, Vermont and Massachusetts
have similar programs. Id. at 93.
177. See id. at 92 (referring to the city plan that makes a four to one match
on all donations under the amount of $250 for candidates agreeing to
expenditure limitations).
178. See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text (describing failed
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comprehensive campaign finance reform is the McCain-Feingold
bill. 179 Among its proposals, the legislation calls for a complete
ban on soft money, an increase in hard money contribution
limits, and restrictions on the airing of issue advertisements
within sixty days of a general election and thirty days of a
primary.8 0 Although McCain-Feingold has many supporters and
is currently the most visible reform effort, 8 ' many fear it will not
withstand inevitable judicial scrutiny.'8 2 Congress faces a huge
task in structuring a system that is both fair and less reliant on
money while still practical enough to provide for individual
campaigning needs. 8 3 It is apparent that legislative efforts to
reform campaign finance
regulations will continue to face
84
obstacles in the future. 1

B. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Supreme Court's
Latest Confirmation of Buckley
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,'85 the Supreme
Court again considered the constitutionality of campaign
federal efforts to reform campaign finance regulations).
179. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001)
(proposing comprehensive campaign finance reforms including a ban on soft
money, better monitoring of independent expenditures, and an increase in hard
money contribution limits).
180. Helen Dewar, Campaign Finance Bill ClearsBig Hurdle:SenateSchedules
Final Vote Monday on McCain-Feingold,WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 200 1, at A6.
181. See Jim Camden, Senate Race About Dollars and Change: Candidates
Spend Millions to Define Themselves, SPOKESMAN REv., Nov. 2, 2000, at Al
(referring to the McCaln-Feingold Bill as the "most visible campaign finance
bill").
182. See Ruth Marcus & Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Bill Could Shift Power
Away From Parties,WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at A9 (speculating that McCainFeingold will be met with an immediate constitutional challenge in the courts);
see also A Wobble on Campaign Finance, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2001, at A22
(referring to a section of McCain-Feingold that prohibits the use of corporate
and union funds to run issue ads within weeks of an election as "a provision
the courts are quite likely to strike down . . . as a violation of the First
Amendment"); Michael Kelly, McCain-Feingold's FatalFlaws, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 2001, at A27 (predicting that the "courts will gut McCain-Feingold from stem
to stem").
183. See John Lancaster, CampaignFinanceBill's Big Test: Can Measure Be
Geared To Survive Court Challenges to Parts?,WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2001, at
A14 (quoting the concerns of Sen. Patty Murry (D-Wa.): "[wle ought to be able to
pass a bill that is fair to all parties ... I really do think people want to change
the system and reduce the amount of money.").
184. See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text (examining the
difficulties reform efforts encounter).
185. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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contribution limits and once again upheld the restrictions."' At
issue in Nixon was a Missouri statute that imposed campaign
contribution limitations similar to FECA, ranging from $250 to
$1000, depending on the office sought. 8 7 The action, initiated
by a PAC and an individual seeking state office,' 8 challenged the
constitutionality of contribution limitations by arguing that such
restraints violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 89 The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri upheld
the statute relying on precedent set in Buckley that allowed such
limitations to prevent voter suspicion and distrust of large
campaign contributions.' 90 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the state was unable to
prove through demonstrable evidence the compelling interest
necessary to validate a statute that infringes upon constitutional
rights. 19'
Citing the large number of states enacting similar
statutes, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the
"congruence of the Eighth Circuit's decision with Buckley.' 92

1. The Majority Upholds Buckley by Strictly Deciding the Case
Before It
A six-to-three majority of the Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit,' 93 finding that Buckley provided direct authority and
186. Id. at 397-98 (relying on precedent in Buckley to uphold the Missouri
statute).
187. Id. at 382 (quoting the statute: "Ito elect an individual to the office of
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor
or attorney general, [[tlhe amount of contributions made by or accepted from
any person other than the candidate in any one election shall not exceed] one
thousand dollars"').
188. Id. at 383.
189. See id. (noting that respondents had not specifically identified the
alleged constitutional violations, but the Court assumed they were for "free
speech, association and equal protection").
190. See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (upholding statutory limitations on campaign contributions).
191. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1998)
(demanding that the state provide "some demonstrable evidence that there were
genuine problems that resulted from contributions in amounts greater than the
limits in place").
192. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 385. The majority consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Souter, O'Connor, Stevens, Breyer, and Justice Ginsburg.
Id. Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia dissented. Id.
193. See id. at 390-92 (directly reversing the lower court's holding requiring
demonstrable evidence of corruption within the electoral process).
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precedent for the Missouri limits.194 The opinion, authored by

Justice Souter, began by reviewing the judicial scrutiny used in
Buckley and reiterating the distinction between contribution and
Following Buckley, the Court
expenditure limitations.1 95
were
expenditures
on
limitations
that
determined
unconstitutional because they were a direct restraint on
96 but similar limits on contributions were permissible
speech,'
because of their marginal effect on speech. 97 The Court

reasserted that a regulation enacted to advance a "sufficiently
interest,"' 98 which does so in a "closely drawn"
important
19920

manner,

is acceptable as a marginal restraint on speech.2 °0

The Court determined that the Missouri law only marginally
restrained free speech and consequently upheld the statute.20 '
194. See id. at 382 ("we hold Buckley to be authority for comparable state
regulation.").
195. See id. at 386 (explaining that the Buckley Court did not clearly identify
the judicial scrutiny employed in its decision). The Court noted that neither the
intermediate scrutiny of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), nor that
utilized for time, place, and manner restrictions were adopted in Buckley. Id.
The Court described the level of judicial review as "'the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment."' Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16).
196. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 386 (determining that "expenditure restrictions
[are] direct restraints on speech").
197. See id. at 386-87 (relying on Buckley to hold that a contribution limit
political
contributor's]
"'involves little direct restraint on ... [the
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by
a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues"').
198. Id. at 388. The Court held that "'[t]he prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption,' were found to be 'constitutionally sufficient
justifications"' for infringing on constitutional rights. Id. The Court supported
this holding by concluding that unchecked corruption, or the appearance
thereof, would cause voters to lose confidence in the electoral process and
would weaken the political system in general. Id. at 388-89.
199. Id. at 387. The means employed in a statute must be narrow and
specific and must not "sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
200. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387. The Court extended the analysis to include
association rights, finding the same distinction between contributions and
expenditures. See id. The Court stated that an "expenditure limit 'precludes
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents'...
[however, the contribution limits] 'leave the contributor free to become a
member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's
efforts on behalf of candidates."' Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).
201. Id. at 392-93. In reaching this holding, the Court concluded that it was
permissible for Congress to legislate against less obvious forms of corruption,
stating that "Congress could constitutionally address the power of money 'to
influence governmental action' in ways less 'blatant and specific' than bribery."
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The majority also responded to criticisms by the dissenters
that the Court did not address the consequences of Buckley and
whether the standard should be overruled, °2 which the
dissenters called the "real issue[s]" before the Court.2 °3 The
majority did not robustly defend the merits of Buckley, but
instead relied upon the argument that the Court was required to
only decide the narrow issues presented in Nixon.2 04 The
majority argued that the petitioners had not asked that Buckley
be overruled and it was thus not appropriate for the Court to
205
Although the concurring and dissenting
consider such action.
opinions argued strongly for the Court to consider the practical
206
the majority
and political consequences of its past decisions,
believed its sole task was to consider the narrow legal issues
relating to the Missouri statute and to follow precedent.2 °7 The
Court concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional and
subsequently reversed and remanded the case for action
consistent with its decision.2 °8
Id. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28). The Court also determined that
additional demonstrable evidence was not necessary to prove the nexus
between large contributions and political corruption. See id. at 391-92. The
Court found the evidence presented during lower court proceedings, such as
"newspaper accounts of large contributions supporting inferences of
impropriety" and the fact that Missouri voters had passed a ballot initiative to
strictly limit campaign contributions, to be adequate. Id. at 393-94. Finally,
the Court reasoned that the limitations were not preventing candidates from
raising the necessary funds to seek office and thus should be allowed. See id.
at 395-96.
202. See id.at 397 (recognizing that the "dissenters in this case think our
reasoning evades the real issue").
203. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court does "much
disservice to our First Amendment jurisprudence by failing to acknowledge or
evaluate the whole operation of the system that we ourselves created in
Buckley"). Justice Thomas also criticized the majority for "blindly" following
precedent set in Buckley and failing to consider subsequent breakdowns of the
logic distilled in that decision. Id. at 420-21.
204. See id. at 397 (responding to calls from the other Justices to consider
the policy implications of its holding by stating that "[tlhe answer is that we are
supposed to decide this case").
205. See id. (stating that petitioners "did not request that Buckley be
overruled").
206. See infra Parts II.B.2-B.3 (calling for the Court to consider factors such
as soft money issue advocacy and the capacity of the legislature to address the
problem).
207. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397-98. The Court asserted that "[tihere is no reason
in logic or evidence to doubt the sufficiency of Buckley to govern this case in
support of the Missouri statute." Id. (emphasis added).
208. See id. (proclaiming its confidence in relying on Buckley precedent).
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2. The ConcurringOpinions: Money Is Property and Balancing
of Interests
Justice

Stevens

opinions. 20 9

and

Justice

Breyer

authored

separate

Although both opinions agreed with the judgment

upholding the Buckley precedent, neither was satisfied with the
analytical approach utilized by the majority to evaluate
campaign finance matters.1 °
Justice Stevens noted the dissenters' call to reexamine the
Buckley decision 21 ' and wrote solely to assert his view that
contribution limits should be analyzed not as a First
Amendment, issue but rather as property and liberty
concerns. 212 In a brief opinion, he colorfully described the
differences between free speech and property issues and
concluded that the Constitution affords greater protection to the
former. 3
Justice Stevens maintained that contribution
limitations involve property rights and as such should be
evaluated under
a lower standard of review than that applied by
21 4
the majority.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, who was joined by
Justice Ginsburg, countered Justice Stevens's contention that
contribution limitations do not warrant First Amendment
protection by arguing that "a decision to contribute money to a
campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern--not because
209. Id. at 398-400 (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing separately to assert his
view that the issue did not relate to rights of free speech but instead to property
and liberty concerns); (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court's

outcome but addressing the issue of judicial scrutiny and the proper role of the
Court).
210. See id. at 389-405 (Stevens, J., concurring) (challenging the Court to
consider a different approach to evaluating campaign finance laws).

211. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring) (responding to Justice Kennedy's
suggestion to re-examine FECA provisions) as though Justice Stevens does not
explicitly state his willingness to reconsider Buckley, it may be inferred because
he contends that the scrutiny standard utilized in Buckley is faulty, he would
support a reevaluation of Buckley precedent. See id. at 398-99.
212. Id. at 398-99 (supporting his assertion with an example: "[tielling a
grandmother that she may not use her own property to provide shelter to a

grandchild-or to hire mercenaries to work in that grandchild's campaign for
public office-raises important constitutional concerns that are unrelated to

the First Amendment").
213. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
214. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (maintaining that property rights are
entitled to legal protection, but not the maximum protection afforded First

Amendment rights).
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money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech. 21 5
Justice Breyer asserted that campaign finance regulations are
entitled to thoughtful review but argued that the use of strict
scrutiny, proposed by Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion,1 6
was inappropriate.2 17
Strict scrutiny and its presumption against constitutionality,
Breyer maintained, was not an appropriate standard for
analyzing statutory limitations on campaign contributions.1 8
Justice Breyer suggested that a better approach was to balance
the conflicting interests present in campaign finance cases,
specifically the right of free speech and the integrity of the
electoral system.1 9 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer argued
that the Court was not restricted to considering only the
statutory limits of the Missouri law.22 ° Instead, Justice Breyer
suggested that the Court should also address the implications of
the decision on campaign finance issues at large.221
In concurring with the majority's judgment, Justice Breyer
agreed that contribution limits were constitutional because their
effect did not prohibit speech but rather "permit[ted] all
215. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the associational aspects
of contributing, namely that a contributor helps a candidate who espouses his
beliefs to become elected).
216. Id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that political speech
represents core First Amendment activity, thus laws abridging that activity
should be "met with the utmost skepticism and should receive the strictest
scrutiny").
217. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Thomas that
political speech "lies at the heart of the First Amendment" but arguing against
strict scrutiny because constitutionally protected interests were at issue on
both sides, and the "strong presumption against constitutionality" was thus
inappropriate).
218. See id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that there is "no place
for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to
accompany the words 'strict scrutiny"').
219. See id. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring) (maintaining that the Court's
primary consideration should be whether one party was burdened under the
law to a greater degree than the other).
220. Id. at 910-11 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to the difficult
constitutional problems raised by campaign finance regulation). Justice Breyer,
unlike the majority, acknowledged the conflicting constitutional interests and
recognized the issues involved reached beyond a mere determination of
Respondents' rights. See id.
221. See id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Generally, Justice Breyer
contends that limitations "democratize the influence that money itself may
bring to bear upon the electoral process" by forcing candidates to seek a
broader base of contributors. Id.
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supporters to contribute the same amount of money, in an
attempt to make the process fairer and more democratic. 2 22 In
Breyer's opinion, the holding protected the rights of contributors
to express their views and also provided for a more equal
political system.2 3 Thus, Breyer argued that the outcome was a
Justice Breyer
just balancing of conflicting interests.2 24
presumed 225the Court's holding was in accordance with legislative
but stated unequivocally that the Constitution
purposes,
demands that the Court reconsider Buckley if the Court's action
prospective comprehensive campaign
inadvertently S•blocks
226
It can be inferred therefore, that Justices
finance legislation.
Breyer and Ginsburg would consider reevaluating Buckley.22 7
3. The Dissenters:Covert Speech and Strict Scrutiny Analysis
The most passionate examinations of the current state of
campaign finance controls, as well as the Court's role in molding
that area of law, were offered in the dissenting opinions of
Justice Kennedy 228 and Justice Thomas. 229 Though they argued

for opposite solutions, both emphatically call for Buckley to be
222. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (countering the criticism that contribution
limitations cannot be imposed to enhance the voice of non-contributing
individuals).
223. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "the statute imposes
restrictions of degree"). The contributor is still allowed to associate himself with
a chosen candidate, but by limiting the amount that may be contributed the
relative influence of other participants is increased and the electoral process is
subsequently more democratic. See id.
224. See id. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that in "[aIpplying
this approach [balancing of interests] to the present case, I would uphold the
statute essentially for the reasons stated by the Court").
225. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to the broad discretion Buckley
granted to the legislature in formulating campaign finance regulations and
concluding that the "legislature understands the problem... better than do
we"). Justice Breyer used as evidence of this discretion the fact that the
legislature had chosen to act on some issues, such as public financing of
elections, but not on others, such as reduced-price media time. See id.
226. See id. at 913-14 (agreeing with Justice Kennedy that if "Buckley denies
the political branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive solutions to the
problems posed by campaign finance . . . the Constitution would require us to
reconsider Buckley").
227. See id. (stating specifically that a re-evaluation of the contribution and
expenditure distinction may be in order).
228. See infra notes 234-44 and accompanying text (considering the
dissenting arguments of Justice Kennedy).
229. See infra notes 245-59 and accompanying text (examining the
dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas).
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dissenting

opinion,

supported limitations on both contributions and expenditures.2 3'
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, argued adamantly against
contribution limitations.23 2 Both Justices recognized that the
Court's acceptance of their respective opinions would reach
beyond the narrow issue presented in Nixon, but still they both
called for an extensive reformulation of the campaign finance
233
system.

Justice Kennedy challenged the majority's reliance on the
principle of stare decisis in reaching its decision. 234

Kennedy

fervently argued that the Court could not rely on precedent
unless it had the "capacity, and responsibility, to acknowledge
its missteps." 23 5
The Court had, in Kennedy's estimation,
missteped in its campaign finance decisions,236 and it was time
230. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 915-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting
repeatedly his opinion that Buckley should be overruled because "Buckley has
not worked"). Justice Thomas provided an equally hostile treatment of Buckley
referring to the "analytic fallacies of our flawed decision in Buckley." Id. at 916
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting "a system in which there
are some limits on both expenditures and contributions, thus permitting
officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather than
on fundraising").
232. Id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding contribution limits "patently
unconstitutional").
Though not explicitly stated in Nixon, Justice Thomas
advocates annulling all campaign financing limitations from prior decisions.
See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
In ColoradoRepublican FederalCampaign Committee, Justice Thomas reiterated
Chief Justice Burger's comment from Buckley that "contributions and
expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin." Id,at 636
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241). Justice Thomas explicitly stated his
conviction "that under traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on
both spending and giving in the political process ...are unconstitutional." Id.
at 640-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
supported overruling Buckley and allowing the legislature to create a new
regulatory structure for campaign finance. Id. at 409-10. Likewise, Justice
Thomas described the analytical foundation of Buckley as "tenuous" and
"eroding" and argued that there is no adequate justification for continuing a
system that unconstitutionally limits contributions. Id. at 412 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
234. See id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (dismissing the idea that the
case represented a "routine application of our analysis in Buckley").
235. Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "[t]he justifications
for the case system and stare decisis must rest upon the Court's capacity, and
responsibility, to acknowledge its missteps").
236. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Court failed to
respond to the adverse consequences of its Buckley decision, but instead
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for the Court to accept responsibility for the adverse, unintended
consequences resulting from such decisions.2 37 Justice Kennedy
maintained that the rules established in Buckley did not lead to
a fairer electoral process but in fact caused the subversion of
political speech. 238 He explained that by upholding only half of
FECA's original provisions,23 9 the Court created a "misshapen
system, one which distorts the meaning of speech." 240

The

Court's complex campaign finance holdings did not limit the
influx of large amounts of cash in elections but merely caused
candidates to utilize loopholes allowing unregulated practices
such as "issue
advocacy" advertisements 24' and "soft money"
contributions.2 42
"perpetuates and compounds a serious distortion of the First Amendment
resulting from our own intervention in Buckley").
237. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the unintended
consequences of the current reliance by candidates on "soft money," which is
unregulated contributions to political parties that is often used to sponsor
"issue advocacy" advertisements). Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion by
stating that the Court should overrule Buckley to prevent further consideration
of First Amendment issues under, what he labels, "the artificial" campaign
finance system." Id. at 410.
238. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that Buckley had not improved
campaign financing, but had forced politicians to be more covert in their
actions).
239. See id. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing how issue advocacy
advertisements, paid for by unregulated contributions to political parties, act as
covert commercials for the candidate). Justice Kennedy maintained that issue
advocacy advertisements have led to "an indirect system of accountability that
is confusing, if not dispiriting, to the voter." Id. at 408. His argument has been
voiced by others including political scientist Anthony Corrado who explained
the detrimental effects of issue advocacy upon the electoral system:
When campaign funds are raised and spent by candidates or political
parties in coordination with candidates, the ballot provides
accountability; candidates can be voted in or out of office, and parties
can be voted in our out of legislative control. But when individuals or
groups not formally affiliated with candidates or parties acting
independently of candidates are engaged in political spending, the
efficacy of the ballot box as a means of promoting accountability is
diminished. This lack of accountability makes it more difficult for
voters to hold elected officials accountable for the manner in which they
conduct their campaigns, which can be an important voting cue for
citizens ....

Anthony Corrado, On the Issue of Issue Advocacy: A Comment, 85 VA. L. REv.
1803, 1808 (1999).
242. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (attributing the rise in soft money issue advocacy
by political parties to the system created in Buckley). Justice Kennedy argued
that Buckley "forced a substantial amount of political speech underground, as
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The core of Justice Kennedy's opinion was that the system
established by Buckley did not work. 243

The Court needed to

make amends for its past mistakes by overturning the decision
so that Congress could enact new legislation that would allow
elected officials to focus their time and efforts on governing
rather than fundraising. 2 "
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, who was
joined by Justice Scalia, also called for the elimination of the
Buckley standard.2 45 His opinion was grounded in the principle
that both campaign expenditures and contributions were forms
of speech that should be protected vigorously and equally.2 46
Justice Thomas challenged the assumption that contribution
limitations are marginal restraints that are entitled to a lesser
degree of constitutional protection. 247 He maintained that in
contributors and candidates devise[d] ever more elaborate methods of avoiding
contribution limits," which led advertisements to conceal the real purpose of the
speech. Id.
243. See id. at 408 (noting that the campaign finance system established in
Buckley has generated dangers, namely covert speech, that are as serious as
those it was created to eliminate).
244. See id. at 409 (arguing that it was time to "open the possibility that
Congress .

..

might devise a system ...

permitting officeholders to concentrate

their time and efforts on official duties rather than on fundraising"). Although
Justice Kennedy was hopeful that Congress would create a system that limited
both contributions and expenditures, he noted his concern that the legislature
would be unable to do so. See id. According to Justice Kennedy, "the existing
distortion of speech caused by the half-way house we created in Buckley ought
to be eliminated." Id. at 410. Although Justice Kennedy intended for Congress
to formulate a new campaign finance regulations, he was unwilling to maintain
the Buckley system until such legislation was enacted and called for the
immediate elimination of the Buckley "half-way house." Id.
245. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring that "our decision in Buckley was
in error, and I would overrule it").
246. See id. at 413 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas did not agree
that contribution limitations were only a marginal restraint on free speech or
that there was a qualitative difference between contributing to a candidate or
directly spending money. See id. He argued that all speech involved input by
individuals other than the speaker and the fact that a contributor enabled
speech by one other than himself should not lessen Its constitutional value.
See id. He reasoned that "'[elven in the case of a direct expenditure, there is
usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender's
message -for instance, an advertising agency or a television station."' Id.
247. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that limits force contributors to
employ less effective means of communicating a chosen message). According to
Justice Thomas "[tlhe decision of individuals to speak through contributions
rather than through independent expenditures is entirely reasonable." Id. at
415. Reasonable because candidates generally utilize the money in a more
productive manner. See id. at 416. As Justice Thomas explains, "[c]ampaign
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practice contribution limitations directly restrained free
speech 24 ' and the majority, by applying its own unique and less
stringent level of scrutiny, was obstructing constitutionally
protected speech249 and limiting the voice of the people .25
Justice Thomas's other principal argument for renouncing
Buckley focused on the improper level of scrutiny traditionally
used by the Court in adjudicating campaign ffiance cases.25'
The Buckley Court never clearly articulated its "exacting
scrutiny" standard 2 and Justice Thomas asserted that the
Court should demand nothing less than strict scrutiny because
of the First Amendment implications.2 53 He argued that under
strict scrutiny the limitations would fail because the State of
Missouri lacked both the requisite compelling interest 25 4 and the
organizations offer a ready-built, convenient means of communicating for
donors wishing to support and amplify political messages." Id.
248. See id. at 417 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that contribution
limitations do, in fact, restrain speech because that discount the "distinct role
of candidate organizations as a means of individual participation in the nation's
civic dialogue").
249. See id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority, by
not applying strict scrutiny, has "balance[d] away First Amendment freedoms").
250. See id. at 420 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that decisions regarding
"who shall speak, the means they will use, and the amount of speech sufficient
to inform and persuade" were issues properly determined by the citizens and
candidates and not the government).
251. See id. at 421 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for
applying "something less-much less-than strict scrutiny").
252. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (referring to the
judicial scrutiny to be applied in the case as "the exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment"). Questions relating to the standard of review utilized in
See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A
Buckley remain unsettled.
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1045, 1050 (1985) (discussing the Court's failure to apply a consistent
standard of review in post-Buckley campaign finance cases); see also Jane
Conard, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Campaign Contributions,
Symbolic Speech and the Appearance of Corruption,33 AKRON L. REv. 551, 552
(2000) (arguing that courts apply various standards of review in cases involving
campaign finance because the Buckley decision was ambiguous on this point);
James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11
REGENT U. L. REv. 235, 240 (1999) (noting that "the scrutiny to be applied to
contribution limits is still an open exercise, due primarily to the Supreme
Court's inconsistent use of key language").
253. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In light of the
importance of political speech to republican government, Missouri's substantial
restriction of speech warrants strict scrutiny.").
254. See id. at 423 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reminding the Court that the
only interest held "compelling" and thus sufficient to restrict political
contributions is that associated with reducing corruption or the appearance of
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narrowly tailored means."
Justice Thomas concluded by
reminding his colleagues that political speech was the core of
First Amendment protection 25 and by admonishing the majority

for providing greater protection to judicially defined forms of
speech, such as nude dancing2 5 7 and flag burning, 258 than to an
essential conduit of political speech.259

corruption). Justice Thomas argued that the majority extended the meaning of
corruption far beyond what is reasonable and he reproved the majority for
permitting "vague and unenumerated harms to suffice as a compelling reason
for the government to smother political speech." Id. at 424.
255. See id. at 427-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting the statute is
overinclusive). Justice Thomas argued the Missouri statute is both broader in
scope and more restrictive than the FECA provisions upheld in Buckley. Id. at
424-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that although Buckley
limited contributions to $1000 for Individuals and $5000 for political
committees, the Missouri statute imposes limits on both ranging from $250 to
$1000; these limitations are even harsher, he argued, when inflation is
considered.
Id. at 425 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas also
challenged the majority's contention that the statute does not limit the
fundraising totals by a candidate. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
argued that because "the largest contributors provide a disproportionate
amount of funds" limiting such contributions must affect total amounts raised.
Id. at 426 (Thomas, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Thomas noted
that if "large contributions provide very little assistance to a candidate... the
Court fails to explain why a candidate would engage in 'corruption' for such a
meager benefit." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas maintained
further that a more narrowly tailored means, such as bribery and disclosure
laws, exist to prevent corruption within the electoral process. Id. at 428
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded the limitations were poorly
drafted and overly inclusive, and did little more than "directly suppress the
political speech of both contributors and candidates, and only clumsily
further[ed] the governmental interests that they allegedly serve." Id. (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Founding
Fathers guaranteed free speech for political purposes so the self-governed could
exchange political information).
Justice Thomas argued that "that free
exchange should receive the most protection when it matters the most-during
campaigns for elective office." Id. at 411 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
257. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (holding that nude dancing is expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment).
258. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (finding
unconstitutional the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which prohibits the knowing
mutilation, defacement, burning, or trampling upon the United States flag).
259. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 411-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining
contributions represent political speech).
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIXON: MEMBERS OF THE COURT MOVE IN
VARIOUS DIRECTIONS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

A. The Court's Dissatisfactionwith CurrentCampaignFinance
Regulation Is Clearly Evident in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC
It has been twenty-five years since Buckley was decided and

one could argue that efforts to reform campaign financing have
failed miserably.

6

Nixon was decided in the wake of huge

expenditures during the 1996 presidential campaign and the
subsequent scandals that accompanied those campaign finance
practices. 6 1 It may appear -at first glance that Nixon merely
reinforces of the status quo and thus not notable. The decision
in fact is significant because it illustrates the Court's strong
dissatisfaction with the current state of campaign finance

regulation and its willingness to reform these laws in the
future.2 62 Two-thirds of the Justices participated in separate
opinions stating either explicitly or implicitly their support for a
Current campaign finance
reconsideration of Buckley. 6

regulations fail to halt corruption within the electoral process
and the growth of cynicism among voters. 6 4

Congress has

shown itself to be unable to pass reform legislation. 65 Current
266
In Nixon, the Justices offer varied and
regulations are failing.
This Note now
opposing solutions to the matter at hand. 6
bold
and definitive
proposes
the
argues that Justice Kennedy
action necessary to break the current impasse over campaign
finance regulations.
260. See supra Part lI.A and accompanying notes (examining corruption
within the political system and voter skepticism).
261. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text (reciting the scandals
emanating from the 1996 Clinton presidential re-election campaign).
262. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes (considering the varied
opinions presented in Nixon).
263. See supra notes 205, 227, 233 and accompanying text (examining
suggestions by concurring and dissenting justices that Buckley be
reconsidered).
264. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes (considering examples of
corrupt financing practices and distrust among American voters).
265. See supranote 177 and accompanying text (examining the failure of the
McCain-Feingold bill to pass in the Senate).
266. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
267. See supraPart II.B and accompanying text (reciting the various opinions
of the Nixonjustices).
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The majority refused to accept that its decision possessed
268
broader implications beyond the issues and litigants in Nixon.
The Court maintained that its role was limited to considering the
case before it and arriving at a conclusion based on precedent.
The majority examined whether the Missouri statute represented
a constitutionally permissible means of curtailing the influence
of money in elections, but did not consider whether the statute
was effective in achieving its goals.2 7 0

The majority also did not

examine whether the FECA provisions as modified by the Court
actually prevent corruption or the public's perception of
corruption within the electoral process.27 '
Aware of the
intractable public debate ensuing over campaign finance
practices, the majority chose not to address the broader
dispute. 2 As the highest court in America 7 3 and the implicit
creator of current regulations, 4 the Court should have, in
Justice Kennedy's words, "faceld] up to [the] adverse,
unintended consequences flowing from [the Court's] prior
decisions."27S

Although Justice Breyer likewise did not directly examine the
effectiveness of contribution limitations, he did consider the
broader implications of these restrictions on the political system
as a whole.276
Breyer argued that there are legitimate
268. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (presenting the
majority's view that its role was limited to deciding only those issues pertaining
to the Nixon litigation).
269. See id.(considering the majority's refusal to expand its review to factors
beyond those in Nixon).
270. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (examining the majority's
consideration of the Missouri statute's constitutional validity). Although the
Court found the statutory limitations did not prevent candidates from running
effective campaigns, and noted that voters generally supported such limitations,
it never examined the effectiveness of contribution limitations either within
Missouri or throughout the United States, in preventing corruption or the
appearance thereof. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 382, 396.
271. See Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes (considering the majority's
examination of Nixon and noting its omission of relevant factors).
272. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (noting the majority's choice
to narrow the scope of its consideration in Nixon).
273. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing the Supreme Court as the highest
court in America).
274. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (reciting Justice Kennedy's
contention that the Court had created the unworkable system through its
holding in Buckley).
275. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (considering the larger
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constitutional interests on both sides of the issue and it is the
Court's role to strike a balance between them.7 Justice Breyer
upheld the contribution limitations because he considered them
beneficial to the electoral process by democratizing the influence
of money within the system and encouraging voter trust and
participation. 27 8" He also asserted that the Court should defer to
legislative judgments regarding the need for and scope of
contribution limitations,2 9 and should restrict its consideration
2810
to the relative burdens imposed on the various participants.
Justice Breyer stated specifically that the Court should "defer to
[the legislature's] political judgment that unlimited spending
threatens the integrity of the electoral process."2 8 '
Such
decisions, he contended, are better made by elected officials.2 2
Despite these assertions of support for the majority's decision,
Justice Breyer concluded his opinion by questioning the
effectiveness of the Court's prior decisions regarding campaign
finance regulation 283 and stating his willingness to reconsider
political implications of statutory limitations on contributions).
277. See id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (acknowledging the state's interest
in protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the First Amendment
interest in free speech through political contributions). Justice Breyer agreed
with Justice Stevens' contention that money is not speech, but maintained that
it is entitled to First Amendment protection because it enables speech. See id.
at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
278. See id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that limitations have
the potential of protecting the integrity of the electoral process). Justice Breyer
supported an interest that was specifically struck down in Buckley, namely the
restriction of "'speech [by] some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others."' Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 48-49). The Court, in Buckley, firmly rejected this interest as
"wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49. Justice
Breyer contended that the government routinely employs this practice, citing as
examples the rules of congressional debate and ballot restrictions. See Nixon,
528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
279. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting his
opinion that the Court should employ judicial restraint "[wihere a legislature
has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of
election regulation").
280. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (clarifying that although the Court must
defer to legislative judgments regarding the need for restrictions, it should still
examine and evaluate statutes to guarantee their constitutional validity).
281. Id. at 403-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
282. See id. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that the legislature
has a better understanding of the menacing effects of large contributions on the
electoral system than does the Court).
283. See id. at 404-05 (Breyer, J., concurring). In questioning the usefulness
of the Court's decisions Justice Breyer considers two points: (1) that the
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Buckley in the future. 4
Although Justice Breyer considered the larger issues
implicated by the Court's decision in Nixon, his reliance on the
legislature to cure the ills of campaign finance regulation is
flawed . 285 It is unrealistic to presume the legislature possesses
the fortitude to enact tough and probably unpopular campaign
finance regulations, considering the nature of politics and recent
congressional financing indiscretions.
Although politicians
assert their opposition to big money interests, modem elections
require significant amounts of money and candidates are
dependent upon large contributors.
Consequently, Justice
Breyer's undiminished deference to the legislature on such a
highly political matter appears imprudent.
Justice Stevens's assertion that contributions implicate
property interests rather than rights of free speech is interesting
but inconsistent. He considered money to be property, not
speech,"' and argued that contributions did not merit the same
level of protection as actions that clearly implicate free speech.2 7
This assertion is successfully rebutted by Justice Breyer's
reasoning that although money is not speech, it enables speech,
and as thus should be afforded First Amendment protection. 288
Justice Stevens is alone in his opinion that contribution
limitations do not implicate First Amendment rights, 2"9 and it
seems unlikely that his fellow Justices would be swayed by his
reasoning.
Although Justice Stevens concurred with the
majority in upholding the contribution limitations, he adamantly
distinction relied upon between contributions and expenditures is in fact
inappropriate and should be overturned and (2) that the Court's efforts in
reality are blocking potentially successful reform efforts.
Id. (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
284. See id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing that it may be necessary
to reconsider the holding of Buckley).
285. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (noting Justice Breyer's
assertion that the Court should defer to the legislature's judgment regarding
campaign finance regulation).
286. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (clarifying the
proper scrutiny due to contribution limitations).
287. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (justifying the varying levels of
protection assigned to property and speech rights).
288. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (examining Justice Breyer's
argument that contributions implicate First Amendment rights).
289. See supra Part II and accompanying notes (noting that all of the other
Justices agree that the act of contributing does involve First Amendment
speech).
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rejected the analytical framework employed to do so and one can
infer that he would consider a reevaluation of Buckley in the
future. °
Unlike the majority, Justice Thomas eagerly accepted an
opportunity to reevaluate the law set forth in Buckley, and
willingly considered the larger arguments relating to Nixon.291 He
focused his attention on protecting campaign contributions as
292
First Amendment speech .
Justice Thomas argued that
Buckley should be overturned because the Court fails to employ
strict scrutiny in its analysis of the Missouri contribution
limitations. 293 According to Justice Thomas, some individuals
express their political beliefs through contributions to a
candidate articulating a desired message. 2994 Such activity, he
maintains, is political speech and should be protected under the
First Amendment as ardently as campaign expenditures.9
Thomas argues for the Court to overturn Buckley because it
does not provide equal protection for expenditures and
contributions and Justice Thomas views such limitations as
restraints on free speech.2 96 Buckley, he maintains, discounts
First Amendment rights297 and enfeebles
constitutional
298
protections.
290. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding that "[tlhe
right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, or to fund 'speech by proxy,'
certainly merits significant constitutional protection ... [but not] the same
protection as the right to say what one pleases").
291. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying text (setting out Justice
Thomas's argument).
292. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing the
majority of abandoning the principle that political speech represents the core of
First Amendment rights).
293.

See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying

text (outlining Justice

Thomas's argument that strict scrutiny should be applied in evaluating
contribution limitations).

294. See supra note 247 (presenting Justice Thomas's argument that
contributions represent political speech).
295. See supra note 246 (examining Justice Thomas's contention that
contributions and expenditures should be treated equally).
296. See supranote 245 (calling for Buckley to be overturned).
297. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that
the majority's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to campaign contributions is
attributable to "Buckley's discounting of the First Amendment interests at
stake").
298.

See id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for

weakening the "already enfeebled
afforded campaign contributions").

constitutional protection

that Buckley
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Justice Thomas offered a strong argument for overturning
Buckley and contribution limitations based solely on
299
Justice Kennedy made an
constitutional considerations.
equally compelling argument based primarily on practical
considerations.3 °° Justice Kennedy professed three arguments
in support of his conclusion that Buckley and its imposed
amendments to FECA should be overturned. 30 '

He first argued

that the unintended consequences of the Court's past decisions
are far more threatening to the integrity of the electoral system
than are large contributions. °2
A primary unintended
consequence is the issue advocacy advertisement paid for by
unregulated soft money. 303
Justice Kennedy argues such
advertisements conceal the speaker's true intent and
subsequently mocks the First Amendment.3 °4
Contribution
limitations, he argued, do little to promote the public's trust in
the electoral process and instead cause participants to subvert
their true intentions. °5 Growing cynicism and disillusionment
among voters lends support to Justice Kennedy's conclusion

299. See id. at 430 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Buckley should
be overruled because it diminishes First Amendment rights).
300. See id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (calling for Buckley to be
overturned because the system it created is more harmful to the political
process than the corruption it sought to eliminate).
301. See infra notes 302, 307, 314 and accompanying text (presenting
Justice Kennedy's arguments for overturning Buckley).
302. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
that the current campaign financing practices camouflage the speaker's true
purpose and create questions regarding accountability).
303. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding issue advocacy advertisements
to be covert speech).
304. See id. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the irrationality of a
system where "[ilssue advocacy, like soft money, is unrestricted while
straightforward speech in the form of financial contributions paid to a
candidate, speech subject to full disclosure and prompt evaluation by the
public, Is not") (citation omitted).
305. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing how candidates and other
political participants disguise their true intentions to avoid contribution
limitations).
Political campaigns increasingly rely on "soft money" issue
advocacy to covertly advertise support for a candidate. See id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Contributions of soft money funds to political parties, purportedly
used for party building activities such as "get out the vote" efforts, are not
subject to limitations. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663, 668 (1997). Soft money contributions have
increased substantially within the past decade rising from $89 million in 1992
to $250 in 1996. See id.
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306

that Buckley hinders, rather than helps, the electoral process.
Justice Kennedy's second argument asserted that the
entire system of campaign finance is broken and the legislature
is incapable of fixing it. 30 7

Politicians, he maintained, face an

inherent dilemma, "how to exercise their best judgment while
soliciting the continued support and loyalty of constituents
judgment."318
whose interests may not always coincide with that
Justice Kennedy argued that it is unrealistic to expect a
legislature comprised of individuals who must rely on campaign
contributions to be elected to exercise the unbiased judgment
needed in this matter.3 0 9 Thus far Congress has been unable to
Many
sucessfully reform campaign finance regulations.1 0
Congressmen are concerned about the amount of time that is
Despite these concerns,
spent on fundraising activities.31 '
Congressmen are equally apprehensive about the effects of
campaign finance reforms on their ability to raise the necessary
funds for campaigning.1 2 Justice Kennedy correctly concludes
that the legislature "cannot oppose this system [Buckley] in an
effective way without selling out to it first, 3 13soft money must be
raised to attack the problem of soft money.

306. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (examining the public's
increasing alienation from the political process).
307. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 408-09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding
politicians may find it impossible to pursue valid campaign finance reform while
still pleasing contributors).
308. Id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (examining political considerations
that make it difficult for the legislature to reform campaign finance regulations).
309. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing the ongoing tension
between a politician's need for impartiality and his indebtedness to the
contributors). Justice Kennedy asserted that "[wihether our officeholders can
discharge their duties in a proper way when they are beholden to certain
interests both for reelection and for campaign support is, I should think, of
constant concern not alone to citizens but to conscientious officeholders
themselves." Id.
310. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting the failure of the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill).
311. See Robert D. Novak, McCain's No-Win Win, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2001,
at A19 (quoting frustrated Senator Christopher Dodd: "you have to raise
something like $10,000 almost daily in order to raise the money to wage an
effective defense of your seat.").
312. See Lancaster, supra note 183 (quoting Senator Patty Murry's concerns
regarding the impact of campaign finance reform on her ability to raise funds,
"[oif course everyone looks at this and says what will it do to me personally, it's
obviously a part of our lives").
313. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing a
legislator's reliance on campaign contributions to be elected).

864

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 50:795

This dilemma leads to Justice Kennedy's final argument that
the Court must act to resolve the problems of campaign finance
regulation. 4 He concludes that the current state of campaign
finance regulation should be attributed to missteps taken by the
Court and that it is time for the Court to face up to the
"unintended consequences" of its prior decisions. 3 15 Buckley and
the subsequent structure of FECA are creatures of the Court.1 6
The legislature originally envisioned a system that limited both
contributions and expenditures.3 17 The Court destroyed this
original structure, and with it Congress's intent, and replaced its
own inherently flawed system of regulation.
Unlike his fellow justices, Justice Kennedy examined not only
the constitutional validity of the statutory limitations but also
their practical application and effectiveness. 1 8 In doing so he
concluded that Buckley does not work and should be
overturned.3 9 Justice Kennedy pointedly stated that the current
system of restrictions are failing their purpose because "[tihe
very disaffection or distrust that the Court cites as the
justification for limits on direct contributions has now spread to
the entire
political
discourse. 3 20
Because
political
considerations leave the legislature incapable of comprehensive
reform3 2' and corruption and voter discontent are increasing, 322
314. See id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislature is
unable to rectify the situation and it is, thus, the Court's responsibility to move
forward with campaign finance reform).
315. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority is
incorrectly applying precedent). Justice Kennedy declared that stare decisis
should only be employed when the Court is willing to correct past mistakes,
which Justice Kennedy maintained, the Court is unwilling to do. See id.
316. See id. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (attributing "the unhappy
origins" of the current system to the Court's prior campaign finance decisions).
317. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing FECA as enacted
by Congress, which included limitations on both contributions and
expenditures).
318. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 407 (noting the unfairness of the current system,
which Imposes relatively low limitations on regulated contributions while funds
such as soft money go unregulated). Justice Kennedy conceded the inequality
that exists in a campaign where one candidate enjoys the support of soft money
while the other does not. See id.
319. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding a statute intended to
stop and to prevent corruption should be overturned when "a worse evil
surfaces in the law's actual operation").
320. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (considering the practical effects
of politics within the issue of campaign finance reform). Justice Kennedy
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Justice Kennedy concluded by arguing that it is the Court's
responsibility to reform the impractical, ineffective system it
created

33

The legislature's inability or unwillingness to correct the
inherent problems of campaign finance regulations lends
support to Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the Court must fix
the problems created by Buckley. 4 The Court has concluded
that a state's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption within the electoral process is the only interest
found compelling enough to justify the infringement of
constitutional rights. 5 Current FECA regulations are failing in
that task,3 26 and the time is right for the Court to reconsider and
overturn Buckley. The Court has an opportunity to alter
dramatically campaign finance regulations. It is evident from
Nixon that most members of the Court are unhappy with the
current state of the law.327 It is equally evident that candidates
3 28
and campaigns are still employing corrupt financing practices
and that the public is losing faith in the system.3 29 Current
campaign finance regulations are broken and Congress cannot
or will not fix it. It is probable that the Court will consider
campaign finance regulation again 330 since many on the Court
concluded that "[bly operation of the Buckley rule, a candidate cannot oppose
this system in an effective way without selling out to it first. Soft money must
be raised to attack the problem of soft money." Id.
322. See Part II.A and accompanying notes (examining corruption within the
electoral process and disillusionment among voters).
323. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (attributing the
current system of campaign financing to the Court's prior decisions and placing
upon it the burden of reform). Justice Kennedy observed that "[tlhe current
system would be unfortunate, and suspect under the First Amendment, had it
evolved from a deliberate legislative choice; but its unhappy origins are in our
earlier decree in Buckley, which.., created a misshapen system, one which
distorts the meaning of speech." Id.
324. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
inability to enact substantive reform).
325. See supra note 254.
326. See Part II.A (disclosing numerous examples of corrupt practices by
politicians and examining the public's perception of corruption within the
electoral process and politics in general).
327. See Part II.B and accompanying notes (discussing the various opinions
expressed in Nixon).
328. See Part II.B and accompanying notes (examining political corruption in
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Presidency).
329. See Part I.B and accompanying notes (considering apathy among voters
and the public's general distrust of politics and politicians).
330. The Court examined FECA regulations once again when it heard oral
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previously voiced their willingness to reconsider Buckley. 331 The
Nixon decision provides an excellent source to predict the
positions to be taken by the individual justices.
IV. CONCLUSION

The significance of Nixon is not that it upheld Buckley, but
that it upheld Buckley when the majority of the Justices were
dissatisfied with either the analysis used in that case or the
unintended consequences that emerged since that decision.
Although the limitations established in Buckley were upheld by
a six-to-three majority, five of the Justices would consider
overruling Buckley. FECA limitations are clearly not fulfilling
their intended purpose. Corruption within the electoral process
appears alive and well, and voter cynicism is rising nearly
proportionally to skyrocketing campaign costs and politicians'
efforts to gather yet more money. Thus far the legislature is
unable or unwilling to enact the comprehensive reform so
desperately needed.
Nixon is a clear indicator of the various positions taken by the
Justices on this complex and pressing problem.
Justice
Kennedy's opinion provides a realistic evaluation of the current
situation and is correct in suggesting that the Court should
reconsider Buckley. The unintended consequences of that
earlier decision have proven worse than the corruption it sought
to contain. Political interests have robbed the legislature of its
ability to offer the bold, and perhaps unpopular, reforms
necessary to break the impasse on this issue. It is time for the
Court to reconsider Buckley and the unworkable system of
campaign finance it partially created.
arguments in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee this
term. See 69 USLW 3249, 69 USLW 3257. This case was originally considered
by the Court in 1996. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,
518 U.S. 604 (1996). The Court held that limitations imposed on party
expenditures made in coordination with candidates or their campaigns were
valid. See id. at 624-25. After its decision, the case was remanded to a district
court for consideration of whether the party's First Amendment right to free
speech was violated by the expenditure limitation. See Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Takes Colorado Campaign Finance Dispute, DEN. POST, Oct. 11, 2000, at
A2. The district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals both held
limitations on party expenditures made in coordination with candidates violated
free speech rights. See Joan Biskupic, Justices to Review Political Spending
Limit, USA TODAY, Oct. 11, 2000, at Al.

has not issued an opinion in this case.
331. See supra note 226.
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Twenty-four years after Buckley, the process is far from
improved and, in fact, is worsening. Nixon clearly illustrates the
Court's discontent with the present state of the law and
indicates the likelihood that it will thoroughly reexamine the
Buckley standard soon.
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